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Abstract
Chapter 1 is an overview of the thesis in which I explain why work on housing
markets merits attention, discuss two broad questions that motivated the research,
emphasise the particular avenue I have chosen to pursue, and summarise the new
insights to be learned. I also include a short discussion on the methodologies that
are used.
In Chapter 2, I introduce information heterogeneity into a user-cost house
pricing model. I use the model to shed light on two empirical regularities in the
housing market: the predictability of housing return and the positive relationship
between rent volatility and housing prices. The model also has predictions on over-
pricing and housing price excess volatility.
In Chapter 3, I study a Real Business Cycle model with borrowing constraints
and incomplete information. I show that in such an environment noises in signals
may have real impacts on the macroeconomy; the effects are induced by learning
and amplified and propagated by the collateral effects. Noises may generate sizeable
and persistent fluctuations on consumption, credit, asset price, and output.
In Chapter 4, I implement a new strategy to identify shocks that drive the
co-movements between housing price and consumption. My results show that, in
the United Kingdom, productivity shocks and especially news shocks about future
productivity explain most of the co-movements. I also show that more than half of
the changes in housing price growth were not related to the changes in consumption
growth, which casts doubt on the importance of housing wealth effects on consump-
tion.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
1.1 Why the Housing Market?
Housing is an asset class central to the households; in many countries, it makes up
the largest component of wealth. In the United States (U.S.), for instance, housing
wealth alone is nearly equal to all non-housing wealth for households. The housing
market lies at the heart of economic and financial crises across the world. Bank-
ing crises triggered by housing market collapses have occurred in many developed
countries as well as in emerging countries.1 In the United States, nine of the eleven
recessions since World War II were preceded by sustained and substantial problems
in the housing market.
To the extent that the housing market has been playing so prominent a
role in the economy, it is surprising that it had been of little interest to the main-
stream macroeconomists before the Great Recession. As Leamer (2007) observed,
no macroeconomics textbook placed “real estate” or “housing” front and centre—
even the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) macroeconomics data had
largely missed housing too. A similar observation comes from Iacoviello (2010),
one of whose papers on housing market was once rejected by a macro field journal,
because the editor thought that the paper “focuses on a small niche—the housing
market—with limited evidence that this market has the significance that is implied
for real economic activity (July 17, 2001).”
The fact that mainstream economists largely ignored the housing market
suggests that the market, and in particular its interactions with the macroeconomy,
could not have been understood well. The inadequate attention paid to—and hence
the limited understanding of—the housing market, may have led to the widespread
failure of the profession to foresee the recent burst of the housing bubble in the
United States (as well as in many other countries), and its long-lasting effects on
1Examples are the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1973, Spain in 1977, the United States in 1986,
Norway in 1987, Finland and Sweden in 1991, Japan in 1992, and some Asian countries in 1997-1998.
1
the broader economy.2 Thanks to the 2008-2009 crisis, however, more research
attention has now been directed to the housing market; and substantial progress in
understanding the market, as well as its relationship with the macroeconomy, has
been made since then. We are, nevertheless, still left with many questions open for
more satisfactory answers.
1.2 Two Broad Questions
Among those questions, there are two very fundamental ones: (1) what determines
the market price of housing? (2) how does the housing market affect the wider
economy?
The first question is always intriguing, particularly when there has been a
continuous appreciation of housing prices in a market but the “fundamentals,” such
as strong economic growth and rigid supply, seem not enough to justify the boom.
In such cases, housing is often considered as being overvalued, or more arguably,
there exist “housing bubbles.”3 An understanding of the nature of such booms is
desirable, especially by the policymakers, since it helps to predict whether a boom
is sustainable or not.
In general, there might be more than one factor behind each boom, and
the main driving forces may also vary in different times and markets. Taking the
2000-2006 housing boom in the United States for example, some blame the relaxed
standards for mortgage loans or monetary policy, whereas others attribute it to the
predatory lending and securitisation or even irrational exuberance. If the mech-
anisms and factors that induce undesirable housing cycles—presumably harmful
insofar as they give rise to imbalances in the economy—can be figured out, micro-
prudential and macro-prudential regulations could be imposed. To achieve this,
however, we need both empirical research and theoretical reasoning.
2In a timely staff working paper that was prepared for Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s
2007 Jackson Hole Symposium, Miskin (2007) reviewed the role of housing in the monetary trans-
mission mechanism that had been known to the economists. Despite that the market had already
shown significant deteriorations at that moment, he seemed still optimistic about the prospect of
the economy, as he wrote in the introduction that “Fortunately, the overall financial system appears
to be in good health, and the U.S. banking system is well positioned to withstand stressful market
conditions.” Even Leamer (2007), who had recognised and forcefully emphasised the importance
of housing market in the business cycle, also underestimated the impacts, as he thought “this time
troubles in housing will stay in housing.”(Leamer, 2007, p. 155). Bezemer (2009) identifies twelve
analysts who predicted the crisis but none of them is from the mainstream.
3Researchers do not often agree on whether the housing prices in a market are overvalued. For
example, during the run-up phase of the recent housing cycle in the United States, Shiller (2005)
argued that the run-up was unprecedented and represented a housing bubble, whereas McCarthy
and Peach (2004) and Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) argued that the home valuations were
mostly in line with fundamentals. With hindsight, it seems Shiller was correct. But the fact that
the prices after the collapse have been lingering around the level of the year 2004 also alludes that,
the judgements in the two latter papers were not incorrect by that time.
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One might argue that there is no need to have specific pricing theories for
housing because it is just one type of assets and we have already had many well-
established asset pricing theories. Though housing shares many similarities with
other assets such as stocks, it has many distinct features that make it deserve special
attention. For example, housing is not only an asset but also a consumption good
that provides shelter services—a necessity to the households. Moreover, the size of a
purchase of a home is generally very large and, as a consumer durable, it usually has
very long life; hence housing often comprises a large and potentially volatile share
of the household balance sheet. These distinctions can make the participants in the
housing market very different from those in other asset markets, with respect to the
risk-aversion and incentives, for example. Housing is also tangible and immobile. As
a result, the costs involved in housing transactions, both economic and psychological,
are large, and the location is very important in price determination. Housing is also
different from other assets such as equity in the supply process. The supply of
housing incurs land-buying and construction work. Because of the rigid supply of
land in many countries nowadays, the relatively long construction process, as well
as the slow depreciation, changes in housing supply in response to the changes of
market conditions tend to be sluggish.
These and other features, which I will discuss in due course, can make the
characteristics of housing market quite different from those of other asset markets.
Figure 1.1 shows the historical evolution of prices of homes and stocks in the United
States since 1975. It can be seen that housing prices are less volatile than stock
prices in the short run; this may reflect the large cost involved in the transaction,
which prevents the buying and selling from being too active. The figure also shows
that, while closely related, the booms and busts of stock market and those of housing
market do not always happen at the same time; there was a stock market crash in
1987—though from today’s perspective it was more like a blip—the housing markets
in many cities in the U.S. nevertheless only fell two years later, about the time the
stock market collapsed again. Another more significant “out-of-step” episode is
around the year 2000 when the stock market dot-com bubble burst, but housing
prices did not decline at all. Differences in the dynamics of housing and stock prices
can also be found in many other countries.
3
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Figure 1.1: Housing Prices and Stock Prices in the United States
Notes: Grey areas indicate NBER recession dates (see www.nber.org/cycles.html).
Housing price index and Standard & Poor’s stock price index are from
http://irrationalexuberance.com/. Both indices are in nominal terms.
The second fundamental question arises in the aftermath of the recent hous-
ing market bust. The recession induced by the bust and the slow recovery have led
many to believe that developments in the housing sector might not be just a passive
representation of macroeconomic activity but instead one of the driving forces of
business cycles.
Previous research has identified at least three ways that housing market may
contribute to the macroeconomic fluctuations. First, residential investment itself
is part of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the United States, for instance,
the contribution of residential investment to the weakness before recessions and to
the recovery after recessions are found to be substantial (Leamer, 2007), despite
of its relatively small share in GDP.4 The mechanisms behind this have not been
completely understood, and current models, both econometric and structural, can-
not fully account for the dynamics of residential investment.5 Second, the housing
4The share of housing investment in GDP has been constant around 5 percent throughout the
1952-2008 period (Iacoviello, 2010).
5Several models that are employed by the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. take into account
many mechanisms but still do a poor job (Mishkin, 2007). Iacoviello and Neri (2010)’s estimation
using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model improves the result significantly. In
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may affect business investment. Applying a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR)
model to the data from the U.S., Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) find that there is a
salient co-movement between land prices and business investment after a shock to
the former.6 They propose a collateral mechanism to explain this result, based on
the facts that real estate is an important collateral asset for both small firms and
large corporations,7, and the value of land holdings affects firms’ borrowing capaci-
ty and thereby their business investment and production. Finally, the housing may
affect consumer spending. The strong co-movement between housing prices and
consumption has long be found, and there is a very large literature in estimating
the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth, but no firm conclusion
has been reached. The theoretical mechanism behind this co-movement remains
controversial as well; while some argue for the housing wealth effect derived from a
life-cycle model (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005, 2011), others believe it is the col-
lateral channel that is at work (Iacoviello, 2005), or perhaps that the co-movements
simply reflect the common factors that are driving both (Attanasio, Leicester, and
Wakefield, 2011).
1.3 Focus of This Thesis
In the following three chapters, I provide theoretical models and empirical evidence
on topics that are directly or indirectly related to the two questions discussed above.
The aim is not to be comprehensive, but to make complementary contributions to
the existing literature.
Each of these chapters is self-contained and studies the housing market from
a specific perspective; but they all share a similar focus—information. Chapter 2
introduces information heterogeneity into a house pricing model and explores its
implications for some empirical issues. Chapter 3 characterises a macroeconomic
model in which incomplete information may induce noise to drive “credit cycles.”
Chapter 4 shows, empirically, how the information about future productivity may
help explain the co-movement between housing prices and consumption.
My focus on information is both realistic and hopefully of interest. It is
realistic because neither the current nor the future state of the world is perfectly
known by economic agents, and information plays a nontrivial role in the agents’
decisions. It should be of interest because, although the implications of information
an extension of the model I set up in Chapter 2, I allude to an informational channel that may be
worth exploring.
6They focus on land prices because most of the fluctuations in housing prices are driven by land
prices rather than by the cost of structures.
7With a slight abuse of notation, I use the terms “real estate,” “housing,” and “houses” inter-
changeably in the thesis. Nearly 70% of all commercial and industrial loans in the United States is
secured by collateral assets (Liu, Wang, and Zha, 2013).
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problems for markets such as the stock market have been explored extensively, much
less has been done regarding the housing market.
The theoretical analyses in the first two chapters also recognise several dis-
tinct features of housing. The first feature is that, since a house is both a basic
consumption good and an asset, there is both a rental market and an asset mar-
ket for housing. The non-trivial scale of the rental market implies that rents may
have implications on house pricing more than merely as the dividends of housing
asset. The second feature is that, in contrast to many other financial assets, housing
is almost impossible to short-sell. If households have different opinions about the
market, the short-sale constraint may result in the houses being overpriced because
the pessimistic investors cannot act to counter optimism. Finally, housing or land
is, in practice, commonly used as collateral by firms to obtain credit from the banks
to finance business investment. While the value of housing is determined by the pro-
duction of other goods in the economy, a feedback effect from housing to production
may be significant enough to amplify economic fluctuations.
Though all of the distinct aspects of housing discussed above are already well
known, their implications have not been fully explored. My contribution, especially
in the two theoretical chapters, is that, when we combine these distinctive features
with information imperfection in the housing market, new insights that are discussed
below come out.
In relation to the two questions discussed in Section 1.2, Chapter 2 addresses
the first by providing a house pricing model with information heterogeneity. It
shows that, when agents hold heterogeneous information and cannot short-sell in
the housing market, the housing can be over-priced. The model also features the
consumption role of housing and there exists a rental market. Rental prices are
derived as a result of the market equilibrium; they clear the rental market and at
the same time determine the house prices through a non-arbitrage condition. More
interestingly, as households hold heterogeneous information, both housing prices and
rental prices also play informational roles—they are used as the public signals by
the market participants to infer the unobserved fundamentals. These novel features
are then used to explain the return predictability of rental prices documented in
Glaeser and Gyourko (2007), and the “rent volatility-housing price” relationship
documented in Sinai and Souleles (2005).
Chapter 3 and 4 relate to the second question discussed in Section 1.2. In
Chapter 3, I construct a model where there are two types of agents—households and
entrepreneurs—and land (housing) plays several roles in the economy. Households
are patient in consuming land (housing) and consumption goods and saving. The
entrepreneurs, who produce consumption goods using land as input, are impatient
and need to borrow from the households; however, borrowing must be secured a-
6
gainst land and is limited by the households’ expected value of entrepreneurs’ land
holdings. Neither type of agent has complete information about the fundamentals
of the economy, and land prices and some statistic of land prices will serve as infor-
mative signals, used by agents to infer unobserved fundamentals. High price signals,
which may be due to pure noises, can lead households and entrepreneurs to believe
a strong current economic condition prevails as well as an optimistic perspective for
the future. As a result, households are willing to lend more and entrepreneurs are
able to get more funds for production. That is, pure noise may drive optimism or
pessimism in the expectations of agents, which, through expanding or shrinking the
credit supply, generates macroeconomic fluctuations.
Chapter 4 is an empirical examination of the relationship between the price
of housing and consumption, using the data of the United Kingdom. As pointed
out in the previous section, many believe that housing has significant wealth effect
on the consumer spending, but neither the theoretical underpinning of the effect
nor its empirical magnitude is uncontroversial. Realising that much of the previous
empirical work using macroeconomic data suffers from the endogeneity problem
due to interdependency or omitted, unobservable variables, I estimate a Vector
Autoregression (VAR) model. Though the VAR model estimation does not generate
coefficients for the wealth effect or collateral effect directly, it gives indirect evidence.
More specifically, based on the estimated VAR model and a novel identification
strategy (assumption), I identify the productivity shock and news shock about future
productivity. The investigation following the identification shows that it is these
common factors that drive both the housing price and consumption and that a vast
majority of the variations in housing price are not related to consumption. In other
words, the results imply that the impacts of housing on macroeconomy through the
consumption channel may not be that important.
1.4 Methodology
In the theoretical parts of this thesis, i.e. Chapter 2 and 3, I follow the traditional
paradigm to understand housing market and the macroeconomy by using models
in which agents are “rational”. Furthermore, I employ the Rational Expectations
Equilibrium (REE) framework in these models. The assumption that agents are “ra-
tional” means two things (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). First, agents update beliefs
correctly using Bayes’ law in receiving new information. Second, given their beliefs,
agents make choices that are consistent with their subjective expected utility. Ra-
tional expectations equilibrium further requires “consistent beliefs”—the subjective
distribution agents use to forecast future realisations of unknown variables is indeed
the distribution that those realisations are drawn from. Hence, REE requires not
7
only that agents process new information correctly but also that they have enough
information about the structure of the economy to be able to figure out the correct
distribution for the variables of interest.
The rational expectations hypothesis has become influential since the early
1970s and is now a ubiquitous modelling technique used widely throughout eco-
nomics. In the meantime, it has also received many critiques, especially since the
2007-2009 crisis. There are at least two alternatives: bounded rationality and be-
havioural economics. The literature on bounded rationality retains individual ra-
tionality but relaxes the consistent beliefs assumption: while investors apply Bayes’
law correctly, they lack the information required to know the actual distribution
variables are drawn from. The literature on behavioural economics goes further and
relaxes the individual rationality assumption: it analyses what happens when one or
both of the two rationality assumptions are relaxed, which is typically based on the
experimental evidence compiled by cognitive psychologists (Barberis and Thaler,
2003).
In the housing market literature, behavioural economics has gained substan-
tial attention because of Shiller (2005)’s influential book Irrational Exuberance (2nd
edition). Behavioural economics argues that some features of the asset prices are
most plausibly interpreted as deviations from fundamentals, and that these de-
viations are brought about by the presence of traders who are not fully rational
(Barberis and Thaler, 2003). In his book, Shiller (2005) exhibits a graph which
shows the housing price bubbles cannot be explained by fundamentals such as the
income, population, and construction costs. He then argues for psychology to play
the predominant role. While I agree that psychology may play an important role
in housing appreciation, I think he has overstated the case, possibly for the sake
of drawing people’s attention to social epidemics. I show in Chapter 2 that sev-
eral empirical regularities in the housing market, including the over-pricing, can
also be explained by information heterogeneity without assuming the irrationality
of investors.
Imposing rationality on agents is to have a kind of modelling discipline. As
“errors can be used to explain anything,” requiring rationality makes it harder to
come up with ad hoc models. This is one reason to keep the rationality assumption.
But the model in Chapter 2 has its own limitations. Because of its simple setup, the
model only has qualitative implications and cannot be readily used for empirical
assessment. However, Kasa, Walker, and Whiteman (2014) have shown that a
dynamic model with information heterogeneity has the potential to explain the stock
price dynamics in the United States; so I believe a dynamic version of the model
in Chapter 2 will also have the capability to explain the recent housing booms
emerged in many countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain,
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Ireland, et. al.. But this does not mean that information heterogeneity should
be the only cause. It’s hard to believe the remarkable house price appreciations
in those countries were merely driven by information heterogeneity and short-sale
constraints, and I believe other factors, including social epidemics and credit market
developments, have also significantly contributed.
Chapter 3 takes into account the credit market and show a two-way feed-
back can arise between the credit market and housing prices. However, because of
the symmetric information “within island” and the assumption that land cannot
be traded “across islands”, the mechanism of over-pricing alluded in Chapter 2 is
absent. Moreover, the model only looks at the effect of information friction on the
demand side of the credit market, while the supply side of the credit market is mut-
ed. Yet the effect from the credit supply side was arguably much more important
during the 2008 financial crisis, see e.g. Adrian and Shin (2010, 2014). The absence
of endogenous financial shocks and financial institutions is also a weakness of this
chapter (as well as Chapter 2). Implications from the interaction of information
friction and financial institutions will be one focus of my future research.
For the empirical part of Chapter 4, I employ the Structural VAR (SVAR)
method to examine the relationship between housing price and consumption. This
is because the alternatives, such as the linear regression of one equation used by
most of the previous research on this issue, may generate biased estimates because
of endogeneity problems. While instrumental variables estimation or dynamic si-
multaneous equation models with plausible identification (which usually involves
finding some “exogenous” variables) can be used to overcome such problems, find-
ing the appropriate instruments or truly exogenous variables can be very difficult.
For these reasons as well as some others (see e.g. Gottschalk (2001) for a survey),
macro-economists turn to SVAR models which are designed to avoid these problems
that often lead to “incredible” identification restrictions (Sims, 1980). SVAR models
also need to be identified, but they treat all variables as endogenous and decompose
all variables into expected and unexpected parts. The restrictions are imposed only
on the unexpected part where plausible identifying restrictions are easier to find.
Nevertheless, like the simultaneous equation models, SVAR models identification
also suffers from the problem that the restrictions are imposed on a priori grounds
and cannot be tested. As a result, the implications from SVAR models should be
taken with some care.
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Chapter 2
Housing Prices with
Heterogeneous Information
2.1 Introduction
Housing rents have been observed to display some interesting behaviours in the
housing markets. First, Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) find that, not only housing
prices but also rents help to predict future returns on houses.1 Second, Sinai and
Souleles (2005) find that, the larger the rent volatility in a given market, the higher
the housing price in that market. While Sinai and Souleles (2005) have provided
a risk-hedging explanation for their finding, the return predictability problem still
seems unresolved; as Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) observe, “rents may add predic-
tive power to housing price change regressions even if we are not sure why they
have this predictive power.” From the efficient market point of view, neither hous-
ing prices nor rental prices should help to predict future return on houses. Both
housing prices and rental prices are publicly available, easily observed by anyone,
and if they can really predict future housing prices and thereby future returns, all
rational investors will take advantage of them. However, if that were the case, the
competition would drive out any predictable movements in housing prices. Nonethe-
less, empirical research on the housing market has consistently found evidence that
suggests the predictive power of these prices. For example, Case and Shiller (1989,
1990) find that price-rent ratio has the predictive power for future returns.2 Glaeser
and Gyourko (2007) are the first to explicitly discuss the predictive power of rental
prices, and they conjecture that rental prices might be providing some information
not fully embedded in housing prices. They do not, however, formally model their
1To avoid confusion, all through the chapter, housing price means the purchase price of a house
and rental price is the price for renting a house. I will use “rental price” and “rent” interchangeably
in the following text, as rental price is equivalent to the rent per unit of house.
2See also Poterba (1991), Gallin (2008), and Engsted and Pedersen (2012). Ghysels, Plazzi,
Torous, and Valkanov (2013) have a comprehensive literature review.
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conjecture. This chapter then aims to provide a specific model to highlight the in-
formation value of rental prices in the housing market, so that not only the return
predictability may be explained but also the relationship between rent volatility and
housing price will be accommodated.
To this end, I construct a two-period model with a continuum of risk-neutral
agents, who not only consume housing services but also speculate in the housing
market for the future resale value of housing. The resale value is exogenously deter-
mined by a shock that is not directly observable to the agents. Instead, each agent
independently receives a private noisy signal about the shock. To make an optimal
forecast, each agent will need to use her privately received signal as well as price
signals including both housing price and rental price to infer the value of the shock
and thereby the resale value of housing. However, because neither aggregate housing
service demand nor total housing supply is observable, information is not fully re-
vealed in equilibrium. Prices are not fully revealing because even agents can subtract
the rent ‘noise’ from the housing price signal, they still cannot tell whether a high
housing price comes from high resale value or low house supply; even though rental
price provides further information about the supply, it does not reveal perfectly to
the agents as they are not sure whether a high rent is due to strong housing service
demand or low supply. Nevertheless, both prices provide useful information to the
agents, because housing prices aggregate private information in the market while
rental prices complement to housing prices by providing more information. More
specifically, rental prices not only refine agents’ information by revealing themselves
as one of the “noises” in the housing price signals but also increase the precision of
housing price signals by providing some more information about the house supply.
In equilibrium, agents will hold heterogeneous beliefs about the resale value, and
housing price will be determined by the agents who are indifferent in buying and
renting.
An important implication from the setup described above is that the market-
implied posterior over the housing resale value conditional on housing prices and
rental prices differs from the Bayesian posterior conditional on the same public
prices information; the Bayesian posterior is derived from the joint distribution of
housing resale value shocks and market equilibrium prices. Following Albagli, Hell-
wig, and Tsyvinski (2015), I call this difference the information aggregation wedge.
Defining the future return on housing as the sum of ex post capital gain and ren-
t from investing a house, the expected return conditional on an econometrician’s
information set will then become the difference between the econometrician’s ex-
pected housing resale value and the market expected housing resale value. If the
econometrician, who observes housing prices and rental prices, only knows the joint
distribution of housing resale value shocks and market equilibrium prices, and fails
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to take into account the expectations heterogeneity in the housing market, then
the expected return conditional on his information set will be the negative of the
nonzero information aggregation wedge. Moreover, because agents in the markets
are learning from prices, the wedge will be varying with both housing prices and
rental prices. Hence, when the econometrician regresses the observed returns on the
lagged housing prices and lagged rental prices, he will find nonzero coefficients on
both price variables! It needs to be emphasised that both heterogeneous information
and non-fully revealing equilibrium are required for this explanation of return pre-
dictability. If agents were homogeneously informed, there would be no need to learn
from prices and prices would not be helpful in any case to predict future return.
If agents were heterogeneously informed, but prices had reflected all information
in the economy, then the private signals would be redundant to agents and there
would be no difference between the market expectation and the expectation based
on econometrician’s information set. In either case, the expected return would be
zero.
As agents are learning from prices, the model also has a potential to explain
the documented positive relationship between housing price and rent volatility. Sinai
and Souleles (2005) first show this pattern using data from the metropolitan sta-
tistical areas in the United States, and they give a risk-hedging explanation about
this relationship. In a stylised model, they show when households are risk-averse,
owning a house involves both taking housing asset price risk and hedging rent fluc-
tuation risk. Which risk dominates on net in this trade-off largely depends on the
households’ expected length of stay and whether they move to correlated housing
markets. When households’ expected length of stay is large or when the spatial
correlation in housing prices is high, larger local rent volatility tends to increase the
households’ home-ownership demand, which will be capitalised into higher housing
price when housing supply is inelastic. In contrast with their explanation, my mod-
el works purely through an information channel given that agents are risk neutral.
Housing price and rent volatility are correlated in my model because rent volatility
affects the precision of price signals and, thereby, agents’ optimal investment deci-
sions in the housing market and, ultimately, the market equilibrium housing prices.
The relationship tends to be positive because when the volatility of rents increases,
the negative information effect from rental prices to housing prices becomes smaller;
as a result, housing prices will be higher.
In addition to the two implications discussed above, the model also has some
predictions about the level and volatility of housing prices. First, housing price is on
average higher than its fundamental value in this model when agents cannot short
sell in the housing market and their private signals are independently, identically
exponentially distributed about the resale value. Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski
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(2015) show, in an asset pricing model where agents are risk neutral and private sig-
nals are normally distributed around the future dividend, that overpricing happens
only when the asset dividend function is dominated by the upside risk. I deviate
from the normal assumption about the signal distribution and find that with an ex-
ponentially dispersed information structure, overpricing happens without the need
to impose restrictions on the risk dominance. This finding is thus a complement
to their results because the empirical distribution for private signals is not clear a
priori, and there is no reason why the private signals must be symmetrically dis-
tributed. For instance, it might make more sense to assume that the majority of the
population receives ‘good’ news about the underlying fundamentals in the ‘good’
times. For the volatility of housing prices, I show the model has the potential to
generate excess volatility in housing prices, which does not arise in a homogeneous
information model. However, because agents are learning from rental prices, the
magnitude of excess volatility is significantly restricted.
The primary contribution of this chapter is that it highlights a particular but
very natural channel through which rental prices might affect housing market infor-
mationally. Economists have long recognised the important role that prices play in
aggregating and transmitting information in markets, and a vast literature seeks to
understand the informational role played by prices for the stock market.3 Much less
has been done regarding the housing market. As opposed to the stock market where
the only price in the market is stock price, there is always a rental price for the hous-
ing market because of the existence of the rental market. Traditional wisdom often
just considers rent as the “dividend” of housing asset that determines the funda-
mental value of houses. But in an economy where agents are not perfectly informed
about the state of the world, rental prices should also convey useful information,
make households better informed, and affect their actions. More importantly, rental
prices may not only affect the rental market itself but also affect the housing market
at the same time. This is because housing rental market and housing asset market
are inevitably intertwined, and the information in the rental market revealed by
the rental prices may also help participants make optimal decisions in the housing
market. No one, however, has formally examined the information role that rents
could play in the housing market.
This chapter thus takes the first step and tries to formalise this information
channel,4 which is then used to explain the two empirical findings discussed above.
3Fama (1991) is a standard reference for the empirical tests, and Brunnnermeier (2001) is an
excellent reference for the theory.
4In theory, housing prices as determined in the housing market may also affect agents’ choice in
the rental market. To make my argument as simple as possible, I preclude the effects of housing
prices on rental prices. A richer setup could have been constructed; however, it may not offer addi-
tional clarity because many effects that are hard to disentangle will interact. Moreover, any other
considerations about the information effects of rental prices should not miss the basic mechanism
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The basic setup in the chapter follows the user-cost approach literature in which the
equilibrium housing price is attained when market participants are indifferent as to
whether to rent or to buy a house, and the cost of owning generally includes, among
other variables, the interest rate, property tax rate, risk premium, expected rate
of housing price appreciation. Previous research, such as Poterba (1984, 1991) and
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), has generally focused on the effects of tax
rates and interest rates on housing price changes but left expected housing price ap-
preciation unexplored. Favara and Song (2014) fill this gap by showing in a dispersed
information model that heterogeneous expectations and no-short-sale constraints on
housing are crucial in generating higher and more volatile housing prices than a ho-
mogeneous information benchmark. However, they neglect the informational role
of rental prices. Gao, Sockin, and Xiong (2015) also study the implications of het-
erogeneous information to the housing market, but they focus on explaining the
hump-shaped relationship between housing cycle and supply elasticity.
My model is also closely related to Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011,
2015), who focus on how alternative payoff assumptions affect information aggrega-
tion and apply their model to examine the effects of skewness on expected returns
in the stock market. More broadly, this chapter belongs to a growing literature that
seeks to generalise noisy rational expectations models beyond the CARA-normal
framework and explore the effects of relaxing these assumptions. For instance, Bar-
levy and Veronesi (2003) show that nonlinear equilibrium price functions which
may generate discontinuous price changes or a “price crash,” can emerge in a model
with binomial payoffs. Breon-Drish (2015) shows in a setting with “exponential
family” distributed payoffs, that shocks to fundamentals may be amplified purely
due to learning effects. He also shows that price drifts can arise naturally and the
disagreement-return relationship depends in a novel way on return skewness.
2.2 Model
In this section, I formalise the intuition described in the introduction part in a simple
two-period model with agents having heterogeneous information. The model intends
to generate qualitative implications with an emphasis on the effects of learning from
rental prices.
2.2.1 Setup
The economy has two periods t ∈ {1, 2}, and there is a measure-of-one continuum
of risk-neutral agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In t = 1 agents only consume housing
service and in t = 2 they only consume non-housing consumption good. More
shown in this chapter.
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specifically, each agent i’s utility function is assumed to be:
Ui = Ai lnBi + Ci,
where Ai is agent i’s housing service preference shock, Bi denotes i’s desired quantity
of housing services in the first period, Ci is i’s non-housing consumption good in
the second period.
In t = 1, nature draws w ∈ R from a normal distribution with zero mean and
variance σ2w: w˜ ∼ N(0, σ2w).5 In the following, I will call w the fundamental shock
as I assume that w determines the resale value of a house Pf in t = 2, according
to an increasing function h(·); that is, Pf = h(w).6 I assume w is not directly
observable to the agents. However, conditional on w, each agent i receives a private
signal wi ∈ [w,+∞) independently and from an identical exponential distribution:
w˜i|w˜ = w ∼ exp(λ;w), ∀i, where λ > 0 is the inverse scale parameter and w appears
as a shift parameter. The conditional distribution function of the private signal of
each agent i is then given by
Fw˜i|w˜(wi|w) = 1− e−λ(wi−w), wi ≥ w, λ > 0.
Though it is unconventional to assume an asymmetric distribution for private
signals, the shifted exponential distribution not only enables me to analytically
characterise the equilibrium but also generates some stronger results than those in
the symmetric signal distribution models, e.g. normal distribution, and thus offers
new insights about asset pricing with heterogeneous information. I further assume
that the law of large numbers applies to the continuum of agents so that conditional
on w the cross-sectional distribution of private signals ex post is the same as the ex
ante distribution of agents’ signals.
In addition to the private signal, each agent i is also endowed with income
Mi ∈ R+ and housing service preference shock Ai ∈ R+ in the first period.7 The
agents do not observe each other’s preference shock, nor do they know the aggregate
preference shock. However, the distribution of the aggregate preference shock A˜
is a common knowledge. Specifically, I assume the aggregate preference shock is
5All through this chapter and the corresponding Appendix A, I use a tilde “∼” on top of a letter
to denote the corresponding random variable.
6Assuming Pf is increasing in w is without loss of generality. Under such an assumption, w
could well be interpreted as the aggregate housing service demand shock in the second period. The
results will remain unchanged if I were to assume a decreasing function for h(w) and interpret w as
the housing supply shock in the second period. It is also possible to consider w as some combination
of both demand and supply shocks.
7As will be seen in the following analysis, the quasi-linear preference precludes any income
effect on agents’ demand for housing services or housing assets, thus the information content of
individual income is irrelevant to the agents. To ensure agent’s consumption in the second period is
non-negative, i.e. Ci ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [0, 1], I assume the income received by each agent Mi is large enough
(see Appendix A.1 for a discussion). It then follows that the distribution of Mi’s is inessential.
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independent of w˜ and follows a log-normal distribution:8∫
Aidi = A ≡ ea, where a˜ ∼ N(0, σ2a).
In period t = 1, each agent needs to decide if she buys houses to live or rents
to live. If she buys houses, she can resell them at the price Pf in the next period to
finance consumption. I assume agents are not allowed to short sell in the housing
market. Therefore, anyone who expects a loss in investing houses will simply save
the rest of their income after rent payment. On the other hand, if the agent expects
it is profitable, she may want to borrow in addition to its endowed income to buy
houses, but the units of houses she can buy will be restricted by a finite number
Z ≥ 1, due to for example regulation constraint or borrowing constraint. The credit
fund is assumed to be supplied exogenously at the fixed rate R. Although the
interest rate is very important to the housing market, it is not the focus of this
chapter. Without loss of generality, I will set R = 1.
Houses are also supplied exogenously as S = e−|ζ| ≡ es, where ζ˜ ∼ N(0, σ2s).
This assumption implies that housing supply is bounded above by one, i.e. S ∈ (0, 1]
and is strictly increasing in s. Housing supply is independent of other random
variables in the model and it is not observable to the agents.
2.2.2 Discussion
As in Favara and Song (2014), my preference specification makes strong assumption-
s: it assumes away intertemporal consumption-saving decision and intra-temporal
consumption-housing decision. Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) develop a
consumption-based asset pricing model in which both decisions are kept and thus
there exists a composition risk in addition to the consumption risk. They show the
composition risk factor has important implications for asset prices. Since the focus
of this chapter is on the information impacts of prices, the assumption in my model
that agents are risk-neutral has assumed away those risk effects.
My specification also implicitly assumes that all houses are homogeneous. In
particular, it does not distinguish the qualities between rental houses and owner-
occupied houses. Smith and Smith (2006) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) show
that on average owner-occupied housing is much larger and better than rental hous-
ing. This suggests that the information contained in rental price might not be very
informative about the owner-occupied housing market. This is indeed important.
However, as long as the two markets are not completely isolated, the mechanism
characterised in the model will still exist.
8Relaxing the independence assumption to, for example, being correlated to w˜ is possible and
may generalise some of the results in Section 2.3. However, a different approach may be needed to
make the characterisation of equilibrium tractable.
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In the setup above, I have also imposed an upper bound for the demand of
housing for each agent. Given the unit measure of agents, this essentially imposes
an upper bound for the total quantity of houses that can be demanded. To ensure
that the housing market will always clear, a corresponding upper bound for the
total house supply must be imposed as well. For simplicity, I have let the upper
bound of total supply be one, in turn, Z then must be equal or larger than one. The
specific sizes of these bounds are not crucial for my results as long as the market
clearing is guaranteed. What’s crucial is that agents cannot take unlimited positions
in the housing market, because agents are risk-neutral and if they are allowed to
take unlimited positions, prices would be perfectly revealing.
Given that the housing supply is crucial to my model, it is worth having a
discussion about the motivation. It is helpful to think that, the total housing supply
in the economy is a fixed number S¯ which is common knowledge, and there are two
types of agents. The first type is the continuum of agents described above, who
can be called the “sophisticated households” or “rational speculators”. The second
type is a continuum of other agents, who do not speculate on housing but only buy
whatever they want to live; they are na¨ıve owner-occupied households. Therefore,
the second type agents are “noise traders”; their opinions and trading patterns may
subject to systematic biases (Shleifer and Summers, 1990). Suppose that the total
number of houses demanded by agents of the second type is a random variable DN .
Then, the total supply to the sophisticated households is simply S ≡ S¯−DN , which
cannot be directly observed by agents of the first type.
2.2.3 Optimality
Let Ei(·) be the expectation of a random variable conditional on i’s information set
Ωi in t = 1. Each agent i’s problem is to choose Bi units of houses to live and Hi
units of houses to invest conditional on her information set in t = 1, so that her
life-time expected utility is maximised:
max
{Bi,Hi}
EiU˜i = Ai lnBi + EiC˜i,
subject to the budget constraint
Ci = R[Mi − PHi +Q(Hi −Bi)] + PfHi, (2.1)
and the trading constraint
Hi ∈ [0, Z].
To derive the optimal strategies chosen by agent i, I substitute (2.1) into his
expected utility function and take partial derivatives w.r.t. Bi and Hi. This gives
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the following first order conditions
Bi =
Ai
Q
, (2.2)
Ei(−P +Q+ P˜f ) ≥ 0, Hi ≥ 0, (2.3)
Ei(−P +Q+ P˜f ) < 0, Hi < 0, (2.4)
where I have let R = 1.
Equation (2.2) characterises agent i’s housing service demand in the house
rental market. That is, the demand for housing services will be higher when the
agent has a stronger preference on housing service or/and when the rental price of a
house is lower. Equation (2.3) and (2.4) characterise agent i’s decision in the housing
market. Whether she chooses to buy or not will be determined by its expectations
of the resale value of houses in the second period. Since the agent is risk-neutral,
she will buy houses when the cost of buying is less than the expected benefit from
owning, i.e. P < Q + EiP˜f . The agent will short sell houses if P > Q + EiP˜f , but
because it is not allowed to do this, she will simply demand zero of housing. The
agent will be indifferent in buying and not buying if P = Q+ EiP˜f .
As the realisation of the fundamental shock w˜ is not directly observable to the
agents, their asset trading decisions involve conditional expectations of an unknown
w. They will need to make inference about w based on all information available to
them so that their decisions made in the first period will be informationally optimal.
Apart from the exogenous signals agents observe, they can also extract infor-
mation from the equilibrium prices: both rental prices and housing prices. Hence,
the information set of each agent i is comprised of both exogenous private signals,
endogenous price signals, and the model structure. That is, Ωi = {Ai, wi, P,Q,M},
whereM captures the notion of rational expectations and the assumption that agents
know the model structure. Because this is a standard assumption in the literature,
without causing any confusion I will omit M in the following text. By assump-
tion, observing one’s own housing preference does not provide useful information
about the aggregate preference shock; the idiosyncratic preference assumption only
serves to prevent housing rental price from fully revealing supply shocks. Thus,
the information set of each agent i can then be reduced as Ωi = {wi, P,Q} and
EiP˜f = E(P˜f |wi, P,Q). Each agent i’s housing asset trading strategy is then a map-
ping from signal-prices (wi, P,Q) into housing asset holdings Hi : [wi, P,Q]→ [0, Z].
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2.3 Equilibrium
Following Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008), I assume that each agent i follows a cut-off
strategy in the housing market as below
Hi =
{
0, if wi < wˇ,
Z, if wi ≥ wˇ,
(2.5)
where wˇ is some endogenously determined threshold. That is, any agent whose
private signal is larger than the cutoff value will buy as many units of houses as
possible, while any agent whose private signal is lower than the threshold value will
not buy any house. Let F (w|Ωi) denote the posterior distribution function of w˜
conditional on agent i’s information set. I then define a cut-off strategy equilibrium
as below.
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium) A cutoff strategy equilibrium consists of two price
functions: P (a, s, w) and Q(a, s); each agent i’s strategies: Hi(Ai, wi, P,Q) and
Bi(Ai, Q), and the posterior belief F (w|Ωi); and the aggregate demands: H ≡
∫
Hidi
and B ≡ ∫ Bidi, such that: (i) for each agent i and some cutoff point wˇ, Hi, Bi ∈
argmax{Hi,Bi}E(U˜i|Ωi), where Hi = Z if wi ≥ wˇ and Hi = 0 if wi < wˇ; (ii) both
housing rental market and housing asset market clear: H = S and B = S, for all
(a, s, w); and (iii) F (w|Ωi) satisfies Bayes’ rule whenever applicable.
2.3.1 Housing Rental Market
The quasi-linear preference makes the characterisation of housing rental market
particularly simple. From equation (2.2), we can see that each agent i’s demand
of housing service Bi is independent of her income and only determined by her
demand shock Ai and the rental price Q.
9 The aggregate demand for housing
services is thus given by
∫
Ai
Q di. The total amount of houses for rent is simply S:
while non-home-buyers are renting from home-buyers who still have extra houses to
rent, home-buyers are renting to live from themselves (and maybe from other home-
buyers as well). Imposing rental market clearing condition yields the equilibrium
rental price
Q =
∫
Aidi
S
≡ A
S
. (2.6)
Thus, in equilibrium rental price will be only determined by the aggregate
9In Favara and Song (2014), agents have logarithmic preferences on both the housing service and
the non-housing consumption good. Hence, the demand for housing service will also be affected by
the expected future consumption or more specifically be affected by the decision made in the housing
market in the current period. They solve their model by log-linearisation and the information effect
of rental price is disregarded. My model avoids this complication while keeps the non-linearity and
makes the effect of rental price relatively easily discussed.
19
demand shock and total housing supply. As will be explicit in the following subsec-
tion, rental prices not only clear the rental market but also provide more information
other than the housing prices alone to the agents to make investment decisions in
the housing market. To simplify the characterisations below, take logs on both sides
of equation (2.6) and I have
y ≡ lnQ = a− s, (2.7)
which is a strictly monotone transformation of Q and thus a sufficient statistic of
the equilibrium housing rental price.
2.3.2 Housing Asset Market
Different from the house rental market, the characterisation of the housing market
equilibrium involves solving for a noisy rational expectations model. It is well-known
that the primary difficulty in solving for such models is that the equilibrium prices
must both clear the market and be consistent with agents’ statistical inferences,
which presents a complicated nonlinear fixed-point problem that does not fit well
into any standard fixed-point theorems. The standard “guess and verify” method
works for models in which the random variables are jointly normally distributed.
With a non-normal joint distribution, this solution technique is not possible since
the functional form of the price is not clear a priori (Breon-Drish, 2015).
Nevertheless, as shown in the following analysis, the constraint on the housing
demand for each agent and the assumption of an exponential distribution for the
private signals, enable me to obtain a new set of sufficient statistics that can replace
the price signals in agents’ information set and make me to solve for the model
easily. A similar idea has been used in the finance literature recently. In a model
with hierarchical information structure, Breon-Drish (2012) avoids this difficulty
by exploiting the market clearing condition to determine a priori a statistic that is
informationally equivalent to any continuous equilibrium price. In the heterogeneous
information setup of Albagli et.al. (2011, 2015), model tractability is achieved by
imposing a trade constraint and assuming an unconventional asset supply function
(see also Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006) and Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and
Yuan (2013)).
Sufficient Statistics
The private signal that agent i receives conditional on w follows a shifted expo-
nential distribution with the cumulative distribution function: Fw˜i|w˜(wi|w) = 1 −
e−λ(wi−w), wi ≥ w, λ > 0. Note that E(w˜i|w˜ = w) = w+ 1λ and V ar(w˜i|w˜ = w) = 1λ2 .
Hence, the smaller the λ is, the larger the mean of the signals given w, and the larger
of signal variance. Given that all agent have the same trading constraint, and that
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w˜ is independent from a˜ and s˜, the housing market clearing condition
∫
Hidi = S
can be written as ∫ ∞
wˇ
Zfw˜i|w˜(wi|w)dwi = S,
where wˇ = wˇ(P,Q) is the cut-off point; any agent whose signal is higher than or
equal to wˇ will buy Z units of houses. Without loss of generality, let Z = 1. Then,
as agents’ signals are exponentially distributed ex post, housing market clearing
condition can be written as e−λ(wˇ−w) = es or wˇ(P,Q) = w − 1λs. That is, for any
realisations of demand, supply, and fundamental shocks, this equation must hold
for the market to be cleared in the equilibrium. Since the left-hand side depends
on (w, s) through P and Q, any pair of equilibrium housing price and rental price
must reveal the statistic
x ≡ w − 1
λ
s, (2.8)
which is half-normally distributed conditional on w˜ = w: x˜|w ∼ HN
(
w, σ
2
s
λ2
)
. Then,
for a given rental price Q, one can determine the information content of equilibri-
um housing price through a new statistic x, independently of the functional form
wˇ(P,Q) if and only if x(P,Q) is strictly monotone in P given Q. In other words,
wˇ(P,Q) needs to be invertible in P given Q. If this strict monotonicity condition
is satisfied, {x, y} can be used as a set of sufficient statistics for {P,Q}.10 That
is, the equilibrium housing price and rental price that investor’s posterior belief is
conditional on, can be replaced by the informationally equivalent statistics x and y.
This equivalence also reveals how rental price signal helps refine agents’ information
set. On the one hand, it reduces the noise in the housing price signal as it is one
of the components in housing price. This is captured by x. On the other hand, it
provides additional information about the supply shock which further reduces the
uncertainty in the housing price signal. A full discussion on the information effects
of rental prices is deferred to subsection 2.3.5 and subsection 2.3.6.
Claim 2.1 Housing price P in the cut-off strategy equilibrium is strictly increasing
in x for any given rental price Q.
Claim 2.1 guarantees the strict monotonicity of wˇ(P,Q) in P given Q. In
the next subsection, I will take this claim as given and use {x, y} instead of {P,Q}
to solve for the agents’ posterior beliefs and the housing price in equilibrium. I will
show this claim indeed holds once the equilibrium housing price is characterised.
10Note that x alone only reveals part of the information content of equilibrium housing price and
rent. More specifically, x only reveals the information content of some nonlinear combination of
housing price and rent. To fully exploit the information contained in P and Q, one still needs to
use rental price or equivalently y in combination with x.
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Heterogeneous Beliefs
Given Claim 2.1, the posterior beliefs in equilibrium can be characterised in the
following lemma:
Lemma 2.1 (1) For price realisations observed along the equilibrium path, agent
i’s posterior belief about w is given by
Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|wi, x, y) =

Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
wi−µ(x,y)
σ
) , if wi < x,
Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ(x,y)
σ
) , if wi ≥ x,
where x ≥ w, y ∈ R, wi ≥ w,w ∈ R, Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function, and
σ ≡
(
λ2
σ2a
+
λ2
σ2s
+
1
σ2w
)− 1
2
,
µ(x, y) ≡
[(
λ2
σ2a
+
λ2
σ2s
)
x−
(
λ
σ2a
)
y + λ
]
σ2.
(2) If wj < wj < x, then F (w|wi, x, y) dominates F (w|wj , x, y) in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance, and F (w|x, x, y) dominates F (w|wi, x, y) in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance. (3) The posterior belief about w conditional on
the cut-off signal is given by Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y) =
Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ(x,y)
σ
) , x ≥ w, y ∈ R, w ∈ R.
The first point explicitly characterises the distribution of agents’ posterior
beliefs in equilibrium that are conditional on the private signals, housing prices, and
rental prices. Agents who receive private signals higher than the cut-off signal will
hold the same posterior belief as that of the cut-off point agent. This is because
the ex post private signals are exponentially distributed “one-sided” on the right
of fundamental shock. Given any rental price, the sufficient statistic for housing
price reveals the cut-off private signal to all agents. Thus, anyone who receives the
private signal that is higher than x will know that her private signal is too good.
The housing price signal gives them a chance to narrow down the distance between
their guess and the true fundamental value.
The second point implies that,11 for agents who receive signals lower than
11Milgrom (1981) shows the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) is both necessary
and sufficient for higher signals of a random variable to be “good news” in the sense of first-order
stochastic dominance, independent of the prior of the random variable. A failure of MLRP, however,
does not preclude the possibility that for some prior the first-order stochastic dominance still holds.
In my case, although the signals distribution does not satisfy strict MLRP, for the normal prior
w ∼ N(0, σ2w), Fw˜|w˜i(w|wi) does first-order stochastically dominate Fw˜|w˜i(w|wj) for wi > wj . Thus,
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the cut-off signal, they will be less optimistic about the resale value than the cut-off
belief. Moreover, the higher the private signal is, the more optimistic the agen-
t’s expectations about the resale value. This is because they know their private
signals are closer to the true value than the cut-off signal, and they remain their
belief unchanged even when they observe the cut-off signal implied by prices. The
heterogeneous posterior beliefs result comes from both the heterogeneous private
information and that the prices are non-fully revealing. If agents had homogeneous
information and identical priors, they will hold homogeneous posterior beliefs. If
agents had heterogeneous information and homogeneous priors, but the public price
signals were fully revealing, then private signals would be redundant to the agents
and they would still hold a homogenous belief.
The third point singles out the posterior belief of the agent who receives the
cut-off signal that will be used in combination with the indifference condition, to
derive the equilibrium price function. This is summarised in Theorem 2.1 in the
next subsection.
Housing Prices
Theorem 2.1 There exists a housing price function in the cut-off strategy equilib-
rium:
P = Q+ V,
where V is the expected housing resale value conditional on the cut-off agent’s in-
formation set
V ≡ E(P˜f |w˜i = x, x˜ = x, y˜ = y) =
∫ +∞
−∞
h(w)d
Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ(x,y)
σ
)
 .
Theorem 2.1 states that, housing price in the equilibrium equals to the sum
of rent and V that I call the market expected housing resale value. This expected
housing resale value is conditional on the cut-off trader’s information set, which
comprises of two public price signals: x˜ = x, y˜ = y, and the cut-off trader’s private
signal whose realisation must equal to the threshold x as well in order to be consistent
with the indifference condition.
The existence of the equilibrium price function is guaranteed if Claim 2.1
holds, which is shown in Appendix A.1 to be the case. The uniqueness of the equi-
librium nevertheless needs a bit more justification, which is left for future research.
To facilitate some of the analysis below, I assume an exponential function form for
“good news” in the sense of higher value of signal leads to higher or equal expectation on Pf as it
is an increasing function of w, and the defined cut-off strategy is legitimate.
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h(·) and then obtain the following housing price function:
Corollary 2.1 If h(w) = ew, then V = exp
(
σ2
2 + µ
)
Φ(κ−σ)
Φ(κ) , and the equilibrium
housing price function is given by
P = ey + exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ
)
Φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ)
,
where κ ≡
(
x
σ2w
+ λy
σ2a
− λ
)
σ.
Despite the seemly simple form of the equilibrium housing price, the existence
of standard normal cumulative distribution function Φ(·), which is highly nonlinear,
makes some of the issues that are of interest cumbersome to analytically charac-
terise. Nevertheless, Φ(·) is a special function which is well-known and can be easily
computed since numerical tools are widely available. Hence, some the discussions
below will be based on numerical computations. To restrict the range of parameters
values, most of time σ2a and σ
2
s will be chosen from (0, 1).
12 Parameter λ reflects the
precision of private signals which does not have a direct measure empirically, hence
I leave it free. For σ2w, I sometimes let σ
2
w = σ
2
a by interpreting the fundamental
shock as the aggregate housing service preference shock in the next period so that
it has a similar variance as in the previous period.
2.3.3 Information Aggregation Wedge
An important implication from Theorem 1 is that the market expected housing re-
sale value, i.e. the market-implied posterior over the housing resale value conditional
on housing prices and rental prices, differs from the Bayesian posterior conditional
on the same public prices information. Following Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski
(2015), I call this difference the information aggregation wedge.
Proposition 2.1 Let Dˆ(x, y) ≡ V − Vˆ be the information aggregation wedge, where
Vˆ ≡ E(P˜f |x˜ = x, y˜ = y). Then, ∀(x, y) ∈ R2, Dˆ > 0.
Proposition 2.1 implies that the information aggregation wedge is always
positive. However, this result must be taken with caution as it relies crucially on
the asymmetry of signal distribution as well as the monotonicity of resale value
function. In a nonlinear model where signals are normally distributed, as in Albagli
12Because lnQ = a− s, where a˜ and s˜ are independent from each other, the volatility of log rent
is simply the sum of variances of the two shocks: V ar(ln Q˜) = V ar(a˜) +V ar(s˜) = σ2a +σ
2
s
(
1− 2
pi
)
.
Data located at Land and Property Values in the U.S., http://www.lincolninst.edu/resources/,
show that V ar(ln Q˜) is about 0.75. If I take into account the interest rate, then lnQ+ lnR = a− s,
and the range of σ2a and σ
2
s will be slightly higher.
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et.al. (2015), such a strong inequality does not exist. Instead, some results about
the unconditional wedge could be established. More specifically, they show that
the unconditional wedge between the asset price with heterogeneous information
and homogenous information will be determined by the shape of Pf = h(·): if
h(·) is dominated by the upside risk (e.g. Pf is convex) then the unconditional
wedge will be positive; if h(·) has symmetric risk then the unconditional wedge
is zero; and if h(·) is dominated by the downside risk (e.g. Pf is concave) then
the unconditional wedge would be negative. The reason is that price places more
weight on the tails of the fundamental distribution from an ex ante perspective. In
my model, the resale value function is exponential and thus dominated by upside
risk, thus the unconditional wedge is expected to be non-negative even if the private
signal distribution is assumed as being symmetric. However, Proposition 2.1 holds
regardless of the shape of Pf as long as it is an increasing function.
2.3.4 Impacts of Learning
The characterised housing price function in Theorem 2.1 also enables me to examine
the impacts of static learning in the heterogeneous information model. If the agents
had perfect information about the resale value of houses, there will be no learning
and the equilibrium housing price will be simply given by
P ∗ = Q+ Pf . (2.9)
In this case, both housing service demand shocks and supply shocks affect housing
prices only through rents in a “fundamental” way: the larger the demand shocks or
the lower the supply shocks, the higher the rents, and thereby the higher the housing
prices. Note that the supply shocks do not affect housing prices through the standard
market clearing channel in the housing market, because the risk-neutral agents will
absorb whatever supply offered when the house is priced at the “fundamental” value.
In the presence of asymmetric information, each agent needs to use its pri-
vate signal and the publicly observed housing price and rental price to learn about
the resale value. Both the demand shock and the supply shock interfere with the
learning process and will have some additional effects. This is so, because price-rent
ratio signal x is a linear combination of fundamental shock w and supply shock s,
and the rental price signal y is a linear combination of housing service demand shock
a and supply shock s.
Proposition 2.2 V is decreasing in s and a, i.e. ∂V∂s < 0,
∂V
∂a < 0.
This proposition implies that, compared to the effects of demand shock and
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supply shock in the perfect information model where no learning is induced, there
will be a further negative effect from the supply shock and an additional negative
effect from the demand shock. Learning makes the negative effect of housing supply
on the housing price larger, and the positive effect of housing service demand on the
housing price smaller.
To understand this result, it is helpful to know how market expectation V
changes in x and y from a comparative statistic point of view. It is already known
from Claim 2.1 that for given y, V will be strictly increasing in x. The increase
in x shifts the cut-off position one-for-one. Since x = w − 1λs, either the increase
of housing fundamental value w or the decrease of house supply s (scaled by 1λ)
will increase x. If w increases, the distribution of private signals shifts up and the
demand for housing asset will increase for a given signal threshold. If instead house
supplies s decreases, the aggregate demand will be relatively high. In both cases,
house supply is relatively scarcer and the cut-off point must be increasing to clear
the market, so does the market expectation and the equilibrium housing price. A
similar comparative static for y can also be obtained.
Proposition 2.3 V is decreasing in y if x remains fixed: ∂V∂y < 0.
This result comes from conditional dependence. Intuitively, although the
rental price does not provide information about w directly, it affects the expectation
of it by providing more information other than housing price alone. Since prices
are not fully revealing, even observing some price-rent ratio signal x in addition
to the private signal, agents are still not sure how much the fundamental value
w is and how much housing supply noise s is.13 Without any further information,
agents will simply use the rule derived from their prior knowledge about those shock
distributions as well as the realised signals, and attribute the observed x to w with
some fixed weight and to s with the rest weight. They then infer w by inversion.
When agents also observe an additional signal about rent, say, high rental price or
equivalently high y, they will rationally attribute high rental price partly to the
low housing supply, since everyone knows that rental price is negatively related to
housing supply. This knowledge and observation will lead them to believe that they
have overestimated the value of s initially and thereby must have overestimated
the value of w using only housing price signal and private signal. They will lower
their expectation on w accordingly and the lower marginal investor’s expectation
results in a lower equilibrium price. Similarly, if they observe a low rental price,
they know housing supply must be higher than they thought before and thus must
13Note that housing supply shock s affects housing price in two fundamental ways: indirectly
affects housing price by affecting rental price through rental market clearing and directly affects
housing price through market clearing.
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have underestimated the value of w. They will increase their expectation on w
accordingly and push up the equilibrium price to a higher level.
The intuition for the conditional dependence may be made more explicit in
a made-up example. Let x˜ = w˜ − s˜λ , y˜ = a˜ − s˜, where w˜ ∼ N(0, σ2w), a˜ ∼ N(0, σ2a),
s˜ ∼ N(0, σ2s) are independent from each other. Appendix A.2 shows E(ew˜|x˜ = x) =
exp
(
E(w˜|x˜ = x) + Σ′2
)
and E(ew˜|x˜ = x, y˜ = y) = exp (E(w˜|x˜ = x, y˜ = y) + Σ2 ),
where E(w˜|x˜ = x) = W ′xx, E(w˜|x˜ = x, y˜ = y) = Wxx+Wyy, and W ′x,Wx,Wy,Σ,Σ′
are some constants defined in Appendix A.2. Because W ′x < Wx and Wy < 0,
conditioning on one more variable y adds a negative effect from y while increases
the elasticity of the conditional expectation on x.
Because ∂V∂y < 0, the change of house supply will have an additional effect on
housing price through the rental price signal; a decrease in s will result in an increase
in y which will make V smaller from Proposition 3. This negative adjustment will
offset some of the initial effects when agents did not use y explicitly for refining
information. In the current setup, this offset will not be large enough to reverse the
direction of effect and thus s still has a negative effect on V overall. On the other
hand, if the housing service demand shock a increases, then given w and s there will
be an increase in y but not in x. Thus, there will only be a negative effect on V .
Agents will mistakenly think some of the increase in y must be from the decrease
of house supply. So they will adjust their expectation on w that is just based on
x. They think they must have overestimated house supply and thus overestimated
the future resale value. When everyone including the cut-off agent downgrades its
expectation, the market expected house resale value will be lower. Thus, the change
of housing service demand shock will have a negative effect, other things equal.
2.3.5 Information Effects of the Rental Price
In the presence of heterogeneous information, rent will have two types of effects on
housing price in equilibrium: as a “fundamental” it has a user cost effect and as a
price signal it has an information effect. The user cost effect is very straightforward
and in this model where the equilibrium housing price is given by P = Q + V ,
it is simply one-for-one: given market expectation about future housing price V ,
when there is a unit increase in rent, so must be the housing price. In contrast,
the information effect of rent on housing price is more involved and deserves some
detailed discussion.
First note that rental price has information effect on housing price in this
model, not because it is directly correlated to the future resale value, but because it
provides additional information other than housing price alone to the agents. One
immediate information value of rental price is that the rental price refines agents’
information by revealing itself as one of the “noises” in the housing price signal.
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From Theorem 1 we can see that rental price is one of the arguments in the housing
price function. Because agents use housing prices as the public signals to infer
the value of w, if they did not observe the rental prices, then housing price as a
signal would be noisier to the agents. Upon observing rental prices, agents can
simply subtract these “noises” from the housing price signals. The result of such
refinement is captured by the statistic x.
The other information value of rental prices is that they can be used to further
reduce the uncertainty about w after getting x. After a preliminary refinement
discussed above, the “noise” left in x is the total housing supply shock s. Since the
rental price that is determined in the rental market is a function of aggregate housing
service demand shocks and total housing supply shock, observing a rental price then
provides agents one additional signal to infer the supply shock noise, which in turn
helps to infer the housing resale value w. Note that the first information effect
is a “level” effect and the change of rent volatility does not change the nature of
that effect. On the contrary, the second effect is a “signal” effect and the change
of rent volatility will change the weights that agents put in this signal. Therefore,
the second information effect from rental prices will be the main driving force in
this model for explaining the observed relationship between housing price and rental
volatility.
Proposition 2.3 states that this second effect tends to lower the market ex-
pected resale value. A hypothetical experiment can make this point even more
straightforward; that is, we want to see how the housing price in a model where
agents make inferences without conditioning on rental price explicitly would be dif-
ferent from the price in the original model? To do this, I first derive the equilibrium
housing price from a model where each agent i does not fully exploit the informa-
tion contained in rental price but instead makes predictions based only on wi and
x. I then compare this price and the price in Corollary 2.1 and check the additional
information effect that rental prices have on housing price. In Appendix A.2, I show
that when Pf = e
w this housing price is obtained as
P ′ = ey + exp
(
σ′2
2
+ µ′
)
Φ(κ′ − σ′)
Φ(κ′)
,
where σ′ = limσ2a→+∞ σ, µ
′ = limσ2a→+∞ µ, and κ
′ = limσ2a→+∞ κ. Therefore,
P ′ is essentially the limit case of the original model where rental price becomes
arbitrarily noisy because of the arbitrarily large housing demand shock σ2a → +∞.14
By comparing the unconditional mean of housing price in Corollary 2.1 and the
unconditional mean of P ′, we can see the average effect of not conditioning on y.
14If the private signal is further assumed to be arbitrarily accurate, housing price in equilibrium
will be the same as the housing price under perfect foresight: limλ→+∞ P ′ = ex + ey = ew + ey.
28
Figure 2.1 shows the unconditional difference E(P −P ′) for different pairs of
(σa, λ) with σs = σa and σw = 0.45. It shows that conditioning on rental price explic-
itly and making use of the additional information decrease the housing price on aver-
age. Note that in the previous made-up example, the law of iterated expectations im-
plies that E[E(ew˜|x)−E(ew˜|x, y)] = E[E(ew˜|x)]−E[E(ew˜|x, y)] = E(ew˜)−E(ew˜) = 0.
However, in the model such unconditional difference is negative, implying again the
failure of law of iterated expectations in the heterogeneous information model. This
negative unconditional difference is crucial for explaining the observed relationship
between housing price and rent volatility.
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Figure 2.1: Information Effect of Rental Price
2.4 Implications
Having the characterised equilibrium housing prices and several derived implica-
tions, I am now able to apply the model to examine several important issues in
the housing market. First, I relate the information aggregation wedge to the re-
turn predictability in the housing market and argue that explaining housing return
predictability does not have to move beyond the rational expectations assumption;
it could be because the econometrician does not observe private information and
fails to take into account the heterogeneous beliefs as well. Next, I show that the
information channel other than the risk-hedging explanation can also be consistent
with the positive relationship between rent volatility and housing price that is doc-
umented in Sinai and Souleles (2005). Third, I show in this model housing will be
priced on average higher than its fundamental value. Finally, I show the model has
the potential to generate excess volatility in housing prices, but learning from rental
prices restricts housing prices from being too volatile.
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2.4.1 Return Predicability
As discussed in the introduction part, both housing prices and rental prices are found
to have some predictive power on the future housing returns. More practically, it
means when an econometrician regresses the observed returns on lagged housing
prices and rental prices, he finds statistically significant coefficients on both price
variables. Specifically, if I define the return for housing asset RH , using the notations
in this chapter, as
RH ≡ (Pf − P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital gain
+ Q︸︷︷︸
rent
, (2.10)
and denote the econometrician’s information set by Ωe = {P,Q,Me}, where Me
captures the econometrician’s knowledge about the economy structure, then the
return predictability on houses from housing prices and rental prices implies that
E(R˜H |Ωe) = G(P,Q) 6= 0,
where G(·) is a function of both housing price and rental price.
If agents in the economy have homogeneous information, or they have het-
erogeneous information but with prices fully revealing information in the economy,
then the econometrician’s information set would be the same as that of the agents,
which implies
G(P,Q) = 0.
Neither housing price nor rental price is affecting the conditional expectation. That
is, a correctly specified econometric model will give zero coefficients on P and Q.
However, if prices are not fully revealing, as in the model I have just shown,
and if the econometrician does not have full information, G(P,Q) will be non-zero.
For instance, if the econometrician’s information set is the same as the Bayesian’s
information, which means the econometrician does not observe the future resale
value of housing nor does he observe the agents’ private information. More impor-
tantly, he does not know that the equilibrium housing prices were generated from
the economy with heterogeneous expectations. Instead, he only knows correctly the
joint distribution of the market prices and exogenous shocks. The econometrician
also observes the market prices: both housing prices and rental prices. With these
assumptions about the econometrician’s information set, it is shown below that the
expected return conditional on his information set is related to the information ag-
gregation wedge introduced in section 2.3.3.
Proposition 2.4 The expected return conditional on the econometrician’s informa-
tion set equals to the negative information aggregation wedge, that is, E(R˜H |Ωe) =
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−Dˆ, where Dˆ is defined in Proposition 2.1.
From Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.4, it immediately follows that the
expected return conditional on econometrician’s information set is non-zero. More
importantly, because the conditional wedge Dˆ is a function of x and y while x is, in
turn, a function of P and Q, the conditional expectation of housing asset return on
the econometrician’s information set will be a nonlinear function of both housing
price and rental price. That is, housing asset return is predictable by both price
and rent! Kasa, Walker, and Whiteman (2014) develop a dynamic asset pricing
model with persistent heterogeneous beliefs, and show that an econometrician, who
incorrectly imposes a homogeneous beliefs equilibrium, will find that the asset price
displays predictability of excess returns.15 The idea here is essentially the same to
theirs. However, by incorporating the mechanism that agents are also learning from
the rental price signals, my model implies both housing prices and rental prices dis-
play predictability of excess returns on houses. Had rental prices not provided more
information other than housing prices alone, even in the heterogeneous information
model the conditional expectation of housing asset return on the econometrician’s
information set will not depend on rental price but will only depend on housing
price.
Because −Dˆ is a complex nonlinear function, it is hard to analytically sign
the effects of prices on G(P,Q). To facilitate the discussion, I assume an exponential
function for the resale value: h(w) = ew, and use the implied expected return for
simulations.
Corollary 2.2 If h(w) = ew, then the expected return conditional on the econo-
metrician’s information set is given by
E(R˜H |P˜ = P, Q˜ = Q) = exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ
)[
exp
(−λσ2) Φ(κ+ λσ − σ)
Φ(κ+ λσ)
− Φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ)
]
.
Numerical simulation based on Corollary 2.2 and calibrated parameters (see
Figure 2.2) shows that E(R˜H |Ωe) could be decreasing in x, which is consistent with
the regression results in Cass and Shiller (1990) and those in Glaeser and Gyourko
(2007): fixing rental price, the higher the housing price the lower the expected future
return. It is not clear how the expected future returns changes in response to the
change of rental prices.
15Because I have let R = 1, the excess return is equivalent to the return.
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Figure 2.2: Expected Return Conditional on Econometrician’s Information
If x in this model is interpreted as the price-rent ratio and if the econometri-
cian thinks that the price-rent ratio has sufficiently aggregated all information in the
market, then we will get another wedge, which is no longer always positive. Howev-
er, the mean of this wedge is still positive. That is, on average, housing prices will be
always higher than the evaluations based only on the price-rent ratio. More formally,
Corollary 2.3 Let Vˇ ≡ E(P˜f |x˜ = x) and Dˇ(x, y) ≡ V − Vˇ . Then, E[ ˜ˇD] > 0.
2.4.2 Rent Volatility and Housing Prices
In a tenure choice model with endogenous housing price, Sinai and Souleles (2005)
show that when the households are risk-averse, owning a house involves both taking
housing asset price risk and hedging rent fluctuation risk. Which risk dominates on
net in this trade-off largely depends on the household’s expected length of stay and
whether they move to correlated housing markets. When the household’s expect-
ed length of stay is large or when the spatial correlation in housing prices is high,
larger local rent volatility tends to increase household’s home-ownership demand,
which will be capitalised into higher housing price when housing supply is inelastic.
Empirically, they find that metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with more volatile
rents have significantly greater price-to-rent ratios. Similar to their findings, my
model may also generate the positive relationship.
Remark 2.2 Housing prices tend to be on average higher when rents are more
volatile.
This is shown through numerical simulations. Figure 2.3 shows the simula-
tions of two parameter sets. In the left, λ = 1 and σw = λa. In the right, λ = 9
and σ2w = 0.1. In both cases, we can see that the unconditional housing price is not
monotonically changing in σ2s . It is increasing in σ
2
s when it is small but decreas-
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ing when it is very large. The effect of σ2a seems ‘more’ monotonic: the larger the
demand shock volatility is, the higher the housing price on average, implying that
the effect of demand shock variance on the rental price signal dominates. Thus,
under reasonable parameter values, higher volatility of rent tends to generate higher
housing price on average.
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Figure 2.3: Rent Volatility and Expected Housing Resale Value
Despite the similar prediction, the channel through which the mechanism
works is completely different from that in Sinai and Souleles (2005). Risk comparison
is the key to their mechanism: if they were to assume households are risk neutral,
the volatility of rent wouldn’t have any effect on homeownership demand or housing
price. The assumption of risk neutral agents in my model precludes any risk impacts,
yet we still see a qualitatively similar effect. This is due to the information effects of
prices and especially the second information effect from rental price I have discussed
before: while x (price-rent ratio) serves as a noisy public signal on the determinant
of the housing resale value, y serves as an additional noisy public signal about the
supply shock s.
This negative information effect from the rental prices is the main cause of
the simulated positive relationship between rent volatility and unconditional housing
prices. Note that the volatility of rent comes from the volatility of demand shocks
and the volatility of supply shocks. When the variance of demand shocks increases,
the volatility of rental price signal becomes larger while the volatility of price-rent
ratio signal remains the same. Agents will then find the rental price signal is not
quite accurate in inferring the supply shock. Hence, the negative effect from the
second effect of rental price signals will be reduced and the housing price will be
higher. On the other hand, if the increase of rent volatility comes from the increase
of supply shock variance, the volatilities of both x and y will increase. While this
decreases the negative effect from y, it also decreases the positive effect from x.
The two effects offset each other and the overall effect depends on their relative
magnitudes. When the first effect dominates, we see housing price increasing.
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2.4.3 Over-Pricing
The model also has some important implications for the pricing of housing. Note
that the proof of Corollary 2.3 relies on the law of iterated expectations: E[E(P˜f |x˜ =
x)] = E[E(P˜f |x˜ = x, y˜ = y)]. It follows that the law of iterated expectations also im-
plies E[E(P˜f |x˜ = x)] = E(P˜f ), where E(P˜f ) coincides with the unconditional mean
of housing price under several other homogeneous information structures. The sim-
plest one is the perfect foresight case where everyone observes Pf . Another one
is that all agents get a public noisy signal about Pf or get no signal at all. Be-
cause of the symmetric information structure, no more information could be learned
from housing price or rental price and housing price in equilibrium will be given
by P = Q + E(P˜f |Ω), where Ω can be ∅. A common feature of these models is
that they all have an identical unconditional mean of housing price which equals
to E(P˜ ∗) = E(Q˜) + E(P˜f ). Therefore, when agents have homogeneous information,
either due to perfect foresight about house resale value or because they have public
noisy information, the housing price will be lower than that with heterogeneous in-
formation on average. This complements to Favara and Song (2014), who show in
a log-linearised dynamic model that housing price with heterogeneous information
and the no-short-sale constraint is on average higher than that with homogeneous
information. More importantly, if I define the perfect foresight house price as the
fundamental value of housing, it implies the over-pricing for houses in this model.
Corollary 2.4 For any increasing function h(·), the mean of housing price defined
in Theorem 1 is strictly larger than the mean of the fundamental value of housing
defined in equation (2.9): E(P˜ ) > E(P˜ ∗).
The exact relation between the unconditional difference E( ˜ˇD) and the under-
lying distribution parameters can be fairly complicated. However, some limiting case
can be seen relatively easily. First note that the precision of x about w is increasing
in λ2 and decreasing in the variance of housing supply σ2s , while the precision of y
on s is increasing in σ2s . Thus, given σ
2
w and σ
2
a, when λ→ 0, the estimate on w is
converging to no information case and the unconditional difference will converge to
zero. If instead λ→∞, the estimate on w is converging to perfect information case
and the unconditional difference will converge to zero too. If σ2s → 0, y becomes
useless but x is very precise about w so it converges to perfect information as well.
However, if σ2s →∞, then on the one hand the signal x is not very precise about w
but on the other hand the signal y is very precise about s, it turns out that y will
have a negative effect while x will have a positive effect.
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2.4.4 Excess Volatility
It has been shown, by Algbali et.al. (2011) in a static model and by Kasa et.al.
(2014) in a dynamic model, that heterogeneous beliefs induced by heterogeneous
information can generate excess volatility in asset prices. In particular, when the
variance of noisy supply becomes arbitrarily large, the excess volatility of price could
be infinite. However, in those models, there is no signal like the rental price as in
my model. I show in this subsection that while my model has the ability to generate
excess volatility in housing prices for the same reason as in those models (i.e. the
failure of the law of iterated expectations due to private information), the learning
from rental prices by the agents restricts housing prices from being too volatile.
Define the excess volatility of housing price as the ratio of V ar(P˜ ) over
V ar(P˜ ∗):
φ∗ ≡ V ar(P˜ )
V ar(P˜ ∗)
. (2.11)
Because the equilibrium housing price is simply the sum of current rent and market
expected future price: P = Q+V , the variance of housing price is given by V ar(P˜ ) =
V ar(Q˜)+V ar(V˜ )+2Cov(Q˜, V˜ ). A similar expression can be written for the variance
of housing price ex post : V ar(P˜ ∗) = V ar(Q˜) + V ar(P˜f ) + 2Cov(Q˜, P˜f ). Thus,
φ∗ =
V ar(Q˜) + V ar(V˜ ) + 2Cov(Q˜, V˜ )
V ar(Q˜) + V ar(P˜f )
,
where I have used the fact that Cov(Q˜, P˜f ) = 0 as a˜, s˜ and w˜ are independent
from each other by construction. Hence, whether equilibrium housing price is more
volatile than that of the ex post housing price (i.e. φ∗ > 1) depends on whether
V ar(V˜ ) + 2Cov(Q˜, V˜ ) > V ar(P˜f ). I have been unable to establish conditions for
this inequality to hold and thus have to use numerical method to simulate for some
sets of parameterisations.
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Figure 2.4 shows that φ∗ could be both higher or lower than one. More
importantly, φ∗ seems to be bounded and converges to one as the variance of sup-
ply shock goes to infinity. This is very different from that in Albagli et.al. (2011)
where the variability of asset prices can be arbitrarily large when the supply shocks
are unboundedly large even the variability of realised dividend is bounded. The
unbounded excess volatility does not seem to exist in my model. After all, a wide
range of parameterisations shows that it is unlikely that this excess volatility could
be infinite. While it is difficult to analyse this result analytically, the intuition may
be very straightforward: the rental price signal in my model, which is naturally from
the housing rental market, provides additional information about the noisy supply.
The reason that the excess volatility in Albagli et.al. (2011) can be very large is
that, the supply shocks become the noises in the asset price signals but there is no
other signal that can be used to infer this noise. Hence, when the supply shock
variance becomes large, the price signals become imprecise, and the pricing can go
very large. However, if there is an additional signal to this noise, the uncertainty
will be restricted because the inference about the noise itself will be more accurate
as its variance becomes larger.
Remark 3 The excess volatility of housing price φ∗ could be either higher or lower
than one, and tends to converge to one as σ2s →∞.
2.5 An Extension: Feedback Effects
The model until now has just assumed the resale value of housing in the second
period is completely exogenous. If I allow that value to be also affected by the
real estate developers’ actions, the basic model then can be extended to study the
feedback effect of prices in the housing market. That is, equilibrium prices will not
only play the role to clear the market but also have real effects on the fundamentals
of the market.
More specifically, the resale value is assumed to be determined by two com-
ponents: Pf = h(w) + g(Sf ), where w can be interpreted as an aggregate preference
shock of the next generation, and Sf as the supply in the next period, which is
determined by the developers in the first period because of the time to build. I
assume g(Sf ) = −
(
θ−1−1
2
)
Sf ≡ −δSf , where 0 < θ < 1, such that the more houses
to build in the first period, the cheaper the price will be in the next period. In the
resale value function, θ is the feedback effect parameter; for a given Sf , the higher
θ is, the higher the future housing price will be. The developers choose the amount
of houses to build in the first period to maximise the expected profit in the second
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period:
max
{Sf}
E
[
P˜fSf − C(Sf )|Ωd
]
,
where C(Sf ) =
1
2S
2
f is the cost involved in building, Ωd is developer’s information
set. The first order necessary condition implies that the optimal construction is
Sf = θE[h(w˜)|Ωd].
Now the assumption about the information set of developers becomes crucial.
I assume the developers know that their new house building in the current period
will have a negative effect on housing value in the next period; however, they do
not know how much the value is going to be. The developers may or may not
have any exogenous information about the next period housing value. In either
case, developers will make use of the current housing prices and rental prices to
indirectly infer the information held by investors. The investors also know that
the indirect use of price signals by developers will have an undesirable effect on
their resale value of houses in the second period, which will, in turn, affect their
trading decisions in the first period. As a simple example, I assume the developers
do not hold any private information about w. Hence, their information set is Ωd =
{P,Q,Md}, where Md captures the assumption that developers know the model
structure. Since developers do not have any private information about w, they
can only rely on the equilibrium rental price and housing price to make inferences.
If Claim 2.1 still holds, then the equilibrium housing price could be obtained as
P = Q + E(h(w˜)|Ωˇ) − (1−θ2 )E(h(w˜)|Ωd). Note that this price is lower than the
benchmark model and when θ = 1 it collapses to the benchmark model housing
price; the higher θ is, the smaller the housing price will be. Alternatively, I could
assume developers also have private information. This, however, will generate high
order expectations problem and poses challenges for solving the model. I will leave
this for future research.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide a house pricing model where agents observe heterogeneous
information about the future resale value of houses. In the model, agents learn
not only from their private information but also from the public information—
housing prices and rental prices, and they hold heterogeneous expectations in the
equilibrium because prices are not fully revealing. I show the model can be used
to explain two empirical regularities—the return predictability of houses from past
prices and the positive relationship between rent volatility and housing prices. I
also show that over-pricing in the housing market may arise if the agents cannot
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short sell in the market. The model has the potential to generate excess volatility
of housing prices, but learning from rental prices greatly restricts the magnitudes of
the excess volatility.
The model in the chapter has a great potential to be extended, and, thus has
potential to explain other phenomena regarding the housing market. I have provided
a simple extension of the model for studying the effects of real estate developers’
learning on the housing supply, which might be of interest to the study of residential
investments behaviour. Other extensions, for instance, the effects of lenders’ learning
on the housing demand, can also be considered in the future research.
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Chapter 3
Noises, Land Prices, and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
3.1 Introduction
In an economy where debt must be fully secured by collateral, an endogenous two-
way feedback can arise between the credit market and the real economy—while firms’
goods production forms the basis of asset prices, asset prices, in turn, determine the
ability of firms to invest and thereby to produce. Such interactions between the
endogenously determined credit constraints and aggregate economic activities have
been shown to amplify and propagate relatively small, temporary shocks to generate
large, persistent fluctuations in output and asset price. Models following this strand
are, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), and Liu, Wang, and
Zha (2013).
In these models, borrowing must be secured against some collateral, which
is typically the land or housing. The total amount of borrowing is usually bounded
by the expected present value of the collateral. This is theoretically reasonable be-
cause it is the future value of collateral that matters in the case of default. Hence,
when the expected future value is high enough, the amount of funds one can bor-
row may exceed current (market or appraised) value of the collateral. Most often,
however, the amount of funds one can borrow is less than the current value of the
collateral; the difference is the down-payment. This is so, perhaps because lenders
are pessimistic about the future value of the collateral, or because the lenders are
risk-averse and the future is very uncertain, or because there are significant trans-
action costs in selling the collateral if borrowers default. If the loan-to-value ratios
are larger than one, it is mostly because the lenders somehow are very optimistic
about the future value of the collateral.
Expectations about the future, on the other hand, must be based on the
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information agents receive up until today. In an economy where agents are not
perfectly informed about the state of the world, the information that agents hold
could be very noisy. This implies that agents’ optimism or pessimism about the
future need not be justified by the economic fundamentals; noises in signals can be
confused by the agents and thereby taken as the fundamental shocks, and finally,
initiate fluctuations in the macroeconomic variables. Some recent empirical research
has shown that noises do play important roles in the short-run fluctuations (e.g.
Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni, 2013).
Macroeconomists have been trying to incorporate the information friction
into the Real Business Cycle models. However, most of the existing models seem
to have neglected the existence of financial frictions.1 The effects of noises on the
macroeconomy may be substantially large when there are also financial frictions.
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. is characterised by large swings in the housing
prices, consumer confidence, credit, as well as other macroeconomic variables such
as consumption and investment. An inclusion of financial friction in the model will
not only generate dynamics of the relevant variables such as housing price and credit
but also have the potential to make the effects of noise shocks sizeable enough.
This chapter then fills this gap by combining two strands of literature to-
gether: financial friction and information friction. I show how learning and financial
friction can together generate boom-bust business cycles initiated by purely noises
in the economy.
3.1.1 Preview of the Model
The model economy is comprised of a continuum of islands, each of which is inhabit-
ed by two types of infinitely-lived agents: non-productive households and productive
entrepreneurs. Islands are isolated from each other; there is no trade or capital flow
among islands. Households on each island desire both consumption good and land
(housing) for utility, while entrepreneurs’ utility only derives from consumption
good; their demand for land comes from the production technology requirement.
Because households are more patient, they tend to be lenders while entrepreneurs
tend to be borrowers. Entrepreneurs started with debt and are constrained in bor-
rowing in each period, they can only use their land holdings as collateral and the
total amount of funds they borrow cannot exceed the (households’) expected liqui-
dation value of the collateralised land in the next period. In each period, each island
is hit by an island-specific productivity shock that is comprised of two components:
an economy-wide common persistent shock and an idiosyncratic transitory shock.
As islands are informationally isolated from each other, there is no direct
way they can share information with each other. However, all of them observe
1La’O (2010) is the only exception I am aware.
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noisy public signals about the economy-wide average land prices. Hence, to infer
the persistent component (agents on each island have the incentive to do so because
it differs with the idiosyncratic shock in the persistence), both the island-specific
shocks and endogenously generated price signals will be used to draw inferences.
Because land price signals are partially determined by the expectations of agents on
other islands, agents on each island must “forecast the forecasts of others” in the
dynamic economy. The infinite regress makes forecast errors serially correlated and
thus generates “waves of optimism and pessimism” in expectations on each island.
As the entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained and the funding is subject to the
households’ expected liquidation value of the collateralised land in the future, any
forecasting errors from noises will directly affect households’ willingness of lending
and entrepreneurs’ investment ability, and thus, cause macroeconomic fluctuations.
To help understand how noise shocks affect the economy, let’s first consid-
er the effect of productivity shocks in the full information model. Suppose en-
trepreneurs on one island experience a temporary negative productivity shock that
reduces their production and therefore their net worth. Being unable to borrow
more, entrepreneurs are forced to reduce investment expenditure including invest-
ment in land, which results in a fall in land price. This is the static effect, and there
is a more powerful dynamic effect. That is, less investment in the current period also
leads entrepreneurs to earn less revenue in the next period, because capital and land
investments are predetermined. This fall in revenue again will force them to reduce
investment in the second period because of the borrowing constraint. As a result,
there will be a further fall in land price and output. The knock-on effects continue,
with the result that entrepreneurs’ demands for land are reduced and therefore falls
in land prices and outputs in all subsequent periods. The anticipated fall in each of
future periods also leads to a further fall in land price in the current period, which
reduces the entrepreneurs’ net worth in the current period still further. Persistence
and amplification reinforce each other. If the negative shock is expected to be per-
sistent, those effects will be even larger and more persistent because the dynamic
effects are stronger.
Consider now the dispersed information model and the effects a negative
noise shock. Since the noise shock does not affect production, entrepreneurs’ net
worth would not fall directly. However, as agents observe a low average land price
signal that tells them something negative might have happened to the common
persistent productivity shock, no matter what their island-specific shock is, both
households and entrepreneurs will believe that production in the future would be
low, which would then force the entrepreneurs to reduce investment expenditure
including investment in land in those future periods. As a result, there would
be falls in land prices and outputs in the future. Those expected falls in future
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land prices will, in turn, depress current land prices and thus indirectly hurt the
current net worth of the entrepreneurs, forcing them to reduce current investment
expenditures.
3.1.2 Related Literature
As already discussed, this chapter builds on two strands of literature: business cycle
models with financial frictions and business cycle models with incomplete informa-
tion. For the former literature, this chapter is mostly related to Pintus and Wen
(2013) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013). Pintus and Wen (2013) add consumption
habit into the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model and shows that the dynamic interac-
tions between the elastic credit supply (due to leveraged borrowing) and persistent
credit demand (due to consumption habit) can generate a multiplier-accelerator
mechanism that transforms a one-time productivity or financial shock into large
and long-lasting boom-bust cycles. Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) construct a similar
but richer model than Pintus and Wen (2013); they use Bayesian estimation and
identify a shock that drives most of the observed fluctuations in land prices. They
show that positive co-movements between land prices and business investment are a
driving force behind the broad impact of land-price dynamics on the macroeconomy.
Neither of them, however, considers the effect of noise shocks on the macroeconomy,
which is the focus of this chapter.
The idea that imperfect information can cause the sluggish adjustment in
economic variables and generate fluctuations driven by expectation errors goes back
to Phelps (1969) and Lucas (1972). There was a period (the 1970s and early 1980s)
of intensive research on expectation-driven business cycle models. However, they
were replaced by technology-driven Real Business Cycle models and New Keynesian
sticky-price models. This waning of interest was caused not so much by convincing
empirical failures, but perhaps by the inability of these models to generate long-
lasting effects on the macroeconomic variables of interests, or by analytical hurdles
that prevented researchers from constructing empirically tractable models (Kasa,
2000). Woodford (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Sims (2003) have renewed
attention to imperfect information and limited information processing as sources
of inertial behaviour. This renewal is quickly followed by, for instance, Lorenzoni
(2009), Angeletos and La’O (2009), and Graham and Wright (2010). These models
build on either New Keynesian model or Real Business Cycle model, and not consider
the interactions between information friction and financial friction.
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3.2 Model
The economy is comprised of a continuum of islands indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Islands
are correlated in their productivity, they are however economically isolated. Each
island is a Kiyotaki-Moore style economy2. More specifically, on each island i,
there is a measure-of-one continuum of infinitely-lived patient agents and a measure-
of-one continuum of infinitely-lived impatient agents. Following the literature, I
call the patient agents the households, and the impatient agents the entrepreneurs.
Households and entrepreneur differ not only in their discount factors but also in
other aspects that will be specified in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Productivity Shocks
In each period t, each island i in the economy is hit by both a common economy-wide
shock and an idiosyncratic shock. Denoted by Ait = e
ait the island-specific produc-
tivity shock on each island i at time t. Then, ait is comprised of two components:
ait = θt + 
i
t, (3.1)
where θt is the economy-wide productivity shock that follows a mean-reverting pro-
cess:
θt = ρθt−1 + vt, where 0 < |ρ| < 1, vt ∼ N(0, σ2v),
and it is the idiosyncratic productivity shock. I assume 
i
t ∼ N(0, σ2 ), ∀i ∈ [0, 1] are
identically independently distributed across time and island and satisfy an adding
up constraint: ∫
itdi = 0,∀t.
Note that the independence of {i} across time is not crucial. What is important to
the model is that the two shocks are different in their persistence; otherwise, agents
have no incentive to disentangle them. Finally, I assume all shocks are orthogonal
to each other.
3.2.2 Households
Households on each island i derive utilities from both consumption good and land.
Households do not produce or accumulate capital goods but provide loans to the
entrepreneurs. The type of loans provided by the households is the one-period loan
that can be used by the entrepreneurs to finance their consumption and investment.
The interests from the previous loans that the entrepreneurs pay to the households
2The economy structure for each island follows Pintus and Wen (2013) and Liu, Wang, and Zha
(2013).
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may be used by the households to finance their current consumption, land invest-
ment, as well as new loans in the next period.
Denote by C˜it the representative household’s consumption on island i in peri-
od t, L˜it the amount of lands owned by the household at the beginning of period t, B˜
i
t
the amount of new loans generated in period t, and E˜it[·] ≡ Π[·|F˜ it ] the household’s
linear least-squares projection conditional on his information F˜ it in period t. Given
the initial land holding L˜i0 ≥ 0 and loan B˜i0 ≥ 0, the problem of the representative
household on island i can be written as
max
{C˜it ,L˜it+1,B˜it+1}∞t=0
E˜i0
∞∑
t=0
β˜t(C˜it + b ln L˜
i
t+1),
subject to budget constraints
C˜it +Q
i
t(L˜
i
t+1 − L˜it) + B˜it+1 = (1 +Rit)B˜it,∀t, (3.2)
where Qit is the relative price of land on island i in period t, R
i
t is the loanable
fund interest rate from time period t to t + 1, β˜ ∈ (0, 1) refers to the household’s
time discount factor, and b his land preference parameter. Note that there are not
superscript for β˜ or b, implying that all households on all islands share the same
discount factor and land preference parameter.
3.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs on each island i derive utilities from consumption Cit but not from
land.3 Their demand for lands comes from production of Y it , the technology of which
requires the inputs of capital Kit and land L
i
t. I assume there is no capital rental
market nor land rental market. Hence, entrepreneurs need to buy capital and land
in the asset markets. The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas
form
Y it = A
i
t(K
i
t)
α(Lit)
γ ,∀t, (3.3)
where Ait is the productivity shock of the representative entrepreneur on island i,
α, γ ∈ (0, 1) are the output elasticities of capital and land respectively. Again, note
that there are not superscript for α or γ, implying that entrepreneurs on all islands
share the same output elasticities.
Given the initial land holding, debt, and capital stock Li0 ≥ 0, Bi0 ≥ 0,Ki0 ≥
3The asymmetry in preference assumption is not essential. Assuming land preference for house-
holds is just a short-cut to have them to demand land. See also Iacoviello (2005).
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0, the problem of the representative entrepreneur on island i can be written as
max
{Cit ,Lit+1,Kit+1,Bit+1}∞t=0
Ei0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Cit)
1−σ
1− σ ,
subject to budget constraints
Cit +K
i
t+1 − (1− δ)Kit +Qit(Lit+1 − Lit) + (1 +Rit)Bit = Bit+1 + Y it ,∀t, (3.4)
and borrowing constraints
(1 +Rit+1)B
i
t+1 ≤ EitQit+1Lit+1,∀t, (3.5)
where Eit[·] ≡ Π[·|F it ] denotes the entrepreneur’s linear least-squares projection con-
ditional on his information F it in period t, β ∈ (0, 1) refers to his time discount
factor, and σ is the entrepreneur’s risk aversion parameter. Land does not depre-
ciate but capital depreciates at rate δ. The entrepreneurs on all islands have the
same discount factor, risk aversion parameter, and capital depreciation rate. Note
that leisure does not enter the utility function. I assume α + γ ≤ 1, which implies
an inelastic labour input assumption. Finally, the assumption that households are
more patient than the entrepreneurs implies that
β < β˜.
3.2.4 Information Structure
The information structure and its implications on the business cycle are the focus of
the chapter. To simplify the analysis, the first assumption I make on the information
structure is that, households and entrepreneurs on the same island have identical
information at all times. This implies
E˜it[·] = Eit[·], ∀i,∀t.
Next, I assume that in each period t, agents on island i observe the history
of their island-specific productivity shocks up to time t, {ait}t−∞. They may also
observe a history of other signals vector {Ψit}t−∞, which will be specified explicitly
in the following analysis.
In addition, I assume that agents cannot share or exchange information across
islands. If agents were able to share information, then even they cannot tell the two
component shocks apart initially, averaging the sequence of signals {ait}i∈[0,1] for
each time period across islands would still reveal the true value of economy-wide
productivity shock to all agents in the economy at all times, because of the zero
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adding up constraint on the islands idiosyncratic shocks.
To facilitate the analysis for the incomplete information model, in which the
past history of signals will be informative to agents4, I follow Walker (2007) and
express the information set of the agents on island i in period t as
F it ≡ Vt(ai) ∨ Vt(Ψi) ∨M, ∀i ∈ [0, 1],
where the operator Vt(x) denotes the Hilbert space generated by the random se-
quence {xt−j}∞j=0 and ∨ denotes the span (i.e. the smallest closed subspace which
contains the subspaces) of the Vt(x) and Vt(y) spaces. If the information sets are
disjoint, then the linear span becomes a direct sum. If Vt(x) = Vt(y), it means
the space spanned by {xt−j}∞j=0 is equivalent to the space spanned by {yt−j}∞j=0, in
the sense of mean square. M captures the notion of rational expectations and the
assumption that agents know exogenous processes and the endogenously generated
processes in the equilibrium. In Section 3.4, I will derive equilibrium under different
assumptions about {Ψit}t−∞. For example, if Ψit = vt,∀t,∀i, the model becomes the
full information case.
3.3 Equilibrium
In this section I define a competitive equilibrium of the economy, and derive the
optimal decisions chosen by households and entrepreneurs.
Definition 3.1
A competitive equilibrium is defined as a sequence of allocations and productions:
{{Cit , C˜it , Lit+1, L˜it+1,Kit+1, Bit+1, B˜it+1, Y it }i∈[0,1]}∞t=0, a sequence of prices:
{{Qit}i∈[0,1], {Rit+1}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0, and a sequence of information sets:
{{F it}i∈[0,1], {F˜ it}i∈[0,1]}∞t=0, such that:
(1) for each island i ∈ [0, 1], given prices, information sets, and the initial endow-
ments: Li0 ≥ 0, Bi0 ≥ 0, L˜i0 ≥ 0, B˜i0 ≥ 0,Ki0 ≥ 0, the allocations:
{Cit , C˜it , Lit+1, L˜it+1,Kit+1, Bit+1, B˜it+1}∞t=0 solve the optimisations problems of house-
holds and entrepreneurs for all t and satisfy the transversality conditions:
limt→∞ βtΛitLit+1 = 0, limt→∞ βtΛitKit+1 = 0, limt→∞ β˜tΛ˜itL˜it+1 = 0; agents form
expectations according to Eit(·) = Π(·|F it ) and E˜it(·) = Π(·|F˜ it ); and
(2) all markets clear.
4If agents can separate the two components from their island-specific shocks, or all agents have
“full information”, the past history of signals will be redundant, and only the current realisations
of shocks will be relevant.
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3.3.1 Households Optimality
The optimal choices of land and lending for the representative households on island
i can be characterised in the following equations (see Appendix B.1)
Qit = β˜E˜itQit+1 +
b
L˜it+1
, (3.6)
β˜(1 +Rit+1) = 1. (3.7)
Equation (3.6) states that the marginal (utility) cost of buying land Qit must
be compensated by the expected marginal benefit β˜E˜itQit+1 + bL˜it+1
, which is the
instantaneous utility gained from enjoying a unit of land as well as the expected
resale value of each unit of land in the next period. Therefore, land not only directly
provides utility to the households but also serves the role of asset, transferring utility
(measured by the numeraire consumption good) between times.
Equation (3.7) shows that households equate the marginal (utility) cost of
lending to the expected marginal discounted benefit β˜(1 +Rit+1). The linear prefer-
ence in consumption good implies that, for the household to be indifferent between
consuming consumption good and lending, the gross interest rate must be always
equal to the inverse of his time-invariant time discount factor.5
1 +Rit+1 = β˜
−1, ∀t.
Note that at the beginning of time t, households’ income for consumption
comes from the predetermined interest of lending at t−1, principle, and the potential
current income from selling land at t.
3.3.2 Entrepreneurs Optimality
The optimal choices of land holdings and borrowing for the representative en-
trepreneur on island i can be characterised in the following equations (see Appendix
B.1)
1
(Cit)
σ
= βEit
α Y
i
t+1
Kit+1
+ 1− δ
(Cit+1)
σ
 , (3.8)
Qit
(Cit)
σ
= ΦitE
i
tQ
i
t+1 + βEit
γ Y
i
t+1
Lit+1
+Qit+1
(Cit+1)
σ
 , (3.9)
5If I were to assume a linear utility for land as well, then the land price equation will be
given by Qit = β˜E˜itQit+1 + b, from which I can solve for the price as Qit = b1−β˜ , ∀t, by ruling out the
explosive solution. However, this setup does not allow me to capture the idea that land prices reveal
information and lead people to make inferential mistakes and thereby cause economic fluctuations.
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1(Cit)
σ
= βEit
[
1 +Rit+1
(Cit+1)
σ
]
+ Φit(1 +R
i
t+1), ∀t, (3.10)
where Φit is the Lagrangian multiplier of the borrowing constraint.
Equation (3.8) equates the marginal cost of buying a capital good (Cit)
−σ
to the expected marginal benefit βEit
[(
α
Y it+1
Kit+1
+ 1− δ
)
(Cit+1)
−σ
]
from the capital
investment. Equation (3.9) states that entrepreneurs equate the marginal cost of
buying land
Qit
(Cit)
σ to the expected marginal benefit βEit
[(
γ
Y it+1
Lit+1
+Qit+1
)
(Cit+1)
−σ
]
from land investment plus the term ΦitQ
i
t. Equation (3.10) states that entrepreneurs
equate the marginal benefit of borrowing 1
(Cit)
σ to the expected marginal cost
βEit
[
(1 +Rit+1)(C
i
t+1)
−σ] plus the term Φit(1 +Rit+1).
The appearance of the terms ΦitQ
i
t and Φ
i
t(1+R
i
t+1) reflects the effect of bor-
rowing constraint. When households are more patient than entrepreneurs, I show
in Appendix B.2 that in the steady state Φi = (β˜ − β)Λi > 0,∀i. It immediately
follows that around the steady state the marginal cost of borrowing is lower than the
marginal benefit due to the positive term Φit(1 +R
i
t+1), suggesting that the borrow-
ing constraint binds around the steady state. In the absence of credit constraint,
equation (3.8) and (3.9) imply that marginal products of capital would be equal
to the real interest rate. However, with credit friction and difference in discount
factors, the real interest rate is lower than the marginal product of capital around
the steady state.
3.3.3 Markets Clearing
For each island i ∈ [0, 1], there are three markets to clear in each period t:
land market: L¯i = L˜it + L
i
t, (3.11)
credit market: B˜it = B
i
t, (3.12)
goods market: Y it = C˜
i
t + C
i
t +K
i
t+1 − (1− δ)Kit , (3.13)
where L¯i is constant ∀i.
3.4 Equilibrium Characterisation
3.4.1 Solution Methods
To characterise the model equilibrium, I need to solve the highly nonlinear system
comprised of equations (3.1)-(3.12).6 To simplify the analysis, I follow the liter-
ature and characterise a log-linear approximation of the system. In a setup with
6By the Walras’ Law, one of the market clearing condition is redundant for solving the model.
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incomplete information, the advantage of log-linearisation could be even more; as
emphasised in Lorenzoni (2009), log-linearisation simplifies the inference problem
of individual agents, the state space for individual decision rules, and aggregation.
However, complex nonlinear equilibrium functions with considerable curvature may
have sizable economic implications. This is particularly true when agents in the
model do not have complete information and have to solve signal extraction prob-
lems. Log-linearisation throws away nonlinear effects and the simplified model may
generate very different implications from those of the original model. For these rea-
sons, the implications in the following analysis may only be reliable for relatively
small or one-off shocks; further work will be needed to examine how robust the
findings are when allowing for larger repeated disturbances that result in a wide
distribution of values for agent net-worth and expectations in each island in each
period rather than a point value.
The log-linearisation procedure in this chapter is standard as in the literature;
that is, I log-linearise the nonlinear stochastic model around the deterministic steady
state under full information. A detailed description of the steady state is available
in Appendix B.2. Following the convention, I use the lower case letters to denote the
log deviations. That is, I define xt ≡ lnXt− lnX, where X is the steady state value
of Xt. The log-linearisation of the optimality conditions, the budget constraints,
and market clearing conditions, which are presented in Appendix B.3, gives me a
linear system that approximately characterises the model equilibrium around the
steady state.
Having the log-linearised model, the next step is to solve the linearised sys-
tem. Different from the standard procedure, which generally employs a programme
package such as Dynare (based on the perturbation methods) to solve for a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model under rational expectations, I solve the model
by hand. More specifically, I first rearrange the log-linearised system into a high-
order stochastic equation in land price for each island i, and a sequence of other
equations in a recursive order. These equations are shown in Appendix B.4. The
key equation to solve is as below
δ1q
i
t−1 + δ2q
i
t + δ3Eit−1qit + (δ4− δ5)Eitqit+1 = δ6Eit−1ait+ δ7ait+ δ8Eitait+1 + δ9
∞∑
j=0
β˜jEitait+2+j ,
(3.14)
where δj ≡ δj(β˜, β, δ, α, γ, σ), j = 1, · · · , 9. Once I obtain the explicit expression for
qit, the rest of variables can be obtained recursively using equations in Appendix
B.4.
Despite that this rearranging procedure is tedious and it does not have any
advantage in solving the full information model, it does show great benefits in solving
models where there is incomplete information among islands and agents are learning
from some endogenously generated variables. This is because in such models the
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learning of rational agents involves an infinite regress problem, and the standard
procedure has difficulty in solving it. In contrast, the way I rearrange the model
equilibrium system gives me a chance to employ a different solution method, from
which I can derive exact analytic solutions to the model. More importantly, this
method can make the comparison between different models clearer.
Having equation (3.14), I then follow Townsend (1983) and first solve it in a
general form. Let
Θit ≡ E(θt|F it ).
In Appendix B.4, I derive a general form solution to equation (3.14) by imposing
the rational expectations equilibrium restriction. This is given by
qit = pi1q
i
t−1 + pi2Θ
i
t + pi3Θ
i
t−1 + pi4a
i
t, (3.15)
where pin = pi({δj}91, ρ), n = 1, 2, 3, 4 are obtained in Appendix B.4.
Note that equation (3.15) is not yet the final solution to equation (3.14). The
final solution requires an explicit expression for Θit, which clearly depends on the
information sets of agents on island i. As will be seen, equation (3.15) makes the
comparison between the solutions under different information extremely straightfor-
ward.
3.4.2 Full Information Benchmark
As a benchmark, it is useful to look at the solution to the model where agents
observe all contemporaneous shocks hitting the economy. In this case, there is no
possibility for agents to confound different shocks, and therefore all noisy signals
will be redundant. This will enable us to see how the picture will be changed if
agents have only incomplete information about the productivity shocks.
Definition 3.2
A full information equilibrium is the definition 3.1, with the agents’ information set
at each time period t specified as F it = FFt = Vt({v, i}i∈[0,1]) ∨Mt,∀i.
Since all agents observe the underlying shocks directly in each period, there
is no room for fluctuations caused by non-fundamental noises, and we have
Θit ≡ Eitθt = θt.
The land price function is then given by
qit = pi1q
i
t−1 + (pi2 + pi4)θt + pi3θt−1 + pi4
i
t.
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That is, land prices follow an ARMA(2,1) process
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)qit = (pi2 + pi4 + pi3L)vt + pi4(1− ρL)it. (3.16)
where L is the lag operator.
3.4.3 Incomplete Information
No Public Signals
In this subsection, I assume agents only observe their island-specific productivity
shock in each period without being able to distinguish between the two components.
Also, they do not observe any public signals. That is, I assume {Ψit}t−∞ = ∅.
Definition 3.3
An incomplete information equilibrium of Type-I is the definition 3.1, with the a-
gents’ information set at each time period t on island i specified as FI,it = Vt(ai)∨Mt.
Without any additional public signal that can be observed by agents on all
islands, the model becomes very simple; each island is an isolated Kiyotaki-Moore
economy. In each period, agents on each island only need to solve a simple signal
extraction problem based on their island-specific productivity shock ait. Applying
the standard Kalman filter formula, I have
Θit = (1− κ)ρΘit−1 + κait,
where κ is the stationary Kalman gain given by
κ ≡
1
σ2
1
σ2r
+ 1
σ2
∈ (0, 1),
in which σ2r is the solution to σ
2
r =
ρ2
1
σ2r
+ 1
σ2
+ σ2v . Substituting Θ
i
t into the general
solution equation, we can see that land prices follow an ARMA(3,2) process
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)(1− (1− κ)ρL)qit
= [pi4+pi2κ+(pi3κ−pi4(1−κ)ρ)L]vt+[pi4+pi2κ+(pi3κ−pi4(1−κ)ρ)L](1−ρL)it. (3.17)
Note that the on-impact effect of one unit shock vt on land price in the full
information model is pi2 +pi4, while the on-impact effect of one unit shock t on land
price in the full information model is pi4. When agents cannot disentangle the two
51
shocks apart, the on-impact effects of the two shocks on land price become equalised
and are given by pi2κ+ pi4. As κ ∈ (0, 1), it follows immediately that the on-impact
effect of vt is smaller than that in the full information model, while the on-impact
effect of t is bigger than that in the full information model.
Exogenous Public Signals
Until now I have discussed the model with only real shocks. Now I am introduc-
ing non-fundamental noises into the model. The simplest way of doing this is to
introduce an exogenous noisy public signal
s∗t = θt + η
∗
t ,
where η∗t ∼ N(0, σ2η∗). The noise shocks are independently identically distributed
across times and independent of all other shocks.
Definition 3.4
An incomplete information equilibrium of Type-II is the definition 3.1, with the a-
gents’ information set at each time period t on island i specified as FII,it = Vt(ai)∨
Vt(s∗) ∨Mt.
As agents’ behaviours will not have any effect on the exogenous signals,
agents on each island are only solving a signal extraction problem a bit complicated
than the previous case. As before, applying the standard Kalman filter formula, I
have
Θit = (1−K1 −K2)ρΘit−1 +K1ait +K2s∗t ,
where
K1 ≡
1
σ2
1
σ2
r∗
+ 1
σ2
η∗
+ 1
σ2
∈ (0, 1),
K2 ≡
1
σ2
η∗
1
σ2
r∗
+ 1
σ2
η∗
+ 1
σ2
∈ (0, 1),
in which σ2r∗ is the solution to the following nonlinear function
σ2r∗ =
ρ2
1
σ2
r∗
+ 1
σ2
η∗
+ 1
σ2
+ σ2v .
Substituting Θit into the general solution equation, land prices follow an ARMA(3,2)
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process
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)(1−K1 −K2)ρL)qit
= {pi4 + pi2(K1 +K2) + [pi3(K1 +K2)− pi4(1−K1 −K2)ρ]L}vt
+{pi4+pi2K1+[pi3K1−pi4(1−K1−K2)ρ]L}(1−ρL)it+(pi2+pi3L)K2(1−ρL)η∗t . (3.18)
With one more public signal about vt, the on-impact effect of one unit shock
vt on land price becomes pi2(K1+K2)+pi4, which is strictly larger than the on-impact
effect of shock t which is pi2K1 + pi4. This is intuitive: more information about vt
makes agents to have more accurate estimation about the shock, and thus react more
heavily to it. The noise contained in the public signal also have significant effect on
the economy; the land price dynamics due to the noise shock is characterised by an
ARMA(2,1) process
(1− pi1L)[1− (1−K1 −K2)ρL]qit = (pi2 + pi3L)K2η∗t , (3.19)
From (3.19), we can see that the on-impact effect of η∗t on land price is pi2K2.
Note that, given σ2r∗ and σ
2
 , K2 is decreasing in the variance of noise σ
2
η∗ . However,
σ2r∗ will be increasing if σ
2
η∗ increases, which tends to make K2 bigger. Hence, the
change of σ2η∗ on the effect of noise shock is non-monotonic; the effect will be small
when σ2η∗ is not very small or very large. That is, when the public signal is very
precise or very imprecise, noise shocks tend to generate small volatility on land price
as well as other variables. As pointed out by Lorenzoni (2009), this non-monotonic
relation between the variance of the noise shocks and the macroeconomic variables
volatility they generate is a peculiar feature of a learning model of business cycles.
If information is revealed one period later, I show in Appendix B.5 that land
price follows an ARMA(2,2) process
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)qit = {(pi2 + pi3L)[ρL+ (1− ρL)(W ∗1 +W ∗2 )] + pi4}vt
+[(pi2 + pi3L)W ∗1 + pi4](1− ρL)it + [(pi2 + pi3L)W ∗2 (1− ρL)]η∗t ,
where
W ∗1 ≡
σ2v(σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗)− σ4v
(σ2v + σ
2
 )(σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗)− σ4v
,
W ∗2 ≡
σ2v(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )− σ4v
(σ2v + σ
2
 )(σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗)− σ4v
.
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The dynamics of land prices due to noise shocks are described by
(1− pi1L)qit = (pi2 + pi3L)W ∗2 η∗t .
Endogenous Public Signals
So far as I have discussed, all the signals are exogenous. In this subsection, I assume
agents on all islands observe a noisy indicator of the economy-averaged land prices
at each time, instead of an exogenous public signal. More specifically, the price
indicator is assumed as
st =
∫
qitdi+ ηt,
where ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η). Because land price on each island is an endogenously gen-
erated variable, which depends on the expectations of economic fundamentals on
that island, st turns out to be an endogenous public signal with some noise ηt.
This seemingly innocuous change in the information sets of agents has a profound
effect on the nature of the rational expectations equilibrium. This is because the
endogenous variable as stochastic processes is itself influenced by the solution of the
signal extraction problems that agents on other islands are simultaneously solving.
As emphasised in the literature, when agents in the economy have heterogeneous
information, the law of iterated expectations for the average beliefs operator typi-
cally does not hold (Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006), and agents on each island must
“forecast the forecasts of others.”
The infinite regress induced from the signal extraction from endogenous pub-
lic signals poses some technical challenges in solving the model, as it implies an
infinite number of state variables so that the standard Kalman filtering formulas
no longer fit. In the recent literature, a method of indeterminate coefficients with
a truncated state space is often used.7 However, this method relies on numerical
simulation and how does the solution look like is not clear. In the following, I
follow the earlier literature in solving such models. More specifically, I assume all
information is revealed with one period lag so that an analytical solution can be
derived. Although this simplification might have made the problem less interesting,
it delivers clearer results that can be compared with the benchmark results.
Definition 3.5
An incomplete information equilibrium of Type-III is the definition 3.1, with the
agents’ information set at each time period t on island i specified as FIII,it =
Vt(ai) ∨ Vt(s, v−1, −1, η−1) ∨Mt.
7See for instance Nimark (2011) and Loronzoni (2009). Kasa (2000), however, shows that
transforming the problem from the time domain into the frequency domain will circumvent the
difficulty and delivers analytic solutions.
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To solve for the land price function and characterise the equilibrium, suppose
the expectation of agents on island i about the common persistent shock θt is a linear
combination of all current and past values of observable signals (ait, q
i
t, s). Since each
of these is a function of the history of the shocks, Θit ≡ Eit(θt) can be represented as
Θit = Pv(L)vt + P(L)it + Pη(L)ηt,
where Pv(L), P(L) and Pη(L) are in general infinite-order, square-summable poly-
nomials in the lag operator L; that is,
Pi(L) =
∞∑
j=0
PijLj , i = v, , η.
Let A(L) = 11−ρL , B(L) ≡ 11−pi1L and C(L) ≡ pi2 + pi3L. In Appendix B.5, I show
given this conjecture and imposing rational expectations condition, θt can be derived
as
Θit = Pv(0)vt +
∞∑
j=1
ρjvt−j + P(0)it + Pη(0)ηt. (3.20)
where Pj(0), j = v, , η are defined in Appendix B.5. Having equation (3.20), the
land price then becomes
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)qit = {(pi2 + pi3L)[ρL+ (1− ρL)Pv(0)] + pi4}vt
+[(pi2 + pi3L)P(0) + pi4](1− ρL)it + [(pi2 + pi3L)Pη(0)(1− ρL)]ηt. (3.21)
which is an ARMA(2,2) process with persistent shock v, transitory shock , and
noise shock η. (i) The on-impact effect of shock vt is pi2Pv(0) + pi4; (ii) the on-
impact effect of shock t is pi2P(0) + pi4. The effect from the noise shock can be
characterised by
(1− pi1L)qit = (pi2 + pi3L)Pη(0)ηt, (3.22)
which is an ARMA(1,1) process with the on-impact effect (from one unit shock)
pi2Pη(0). Comparing (3.22) with (3.19)
(1− pi1L)qit = (pi2 + pi3L)W ∗2 η∗t ,
we can see that the dynamics are defined by the same parameters while they differ
in the on-impact effects.
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3.4.4 Optimism and Pessimism
Having characterised the model equilibrium, I am now able to derive the agents’
forecast errors about the common persistent productivity shock for the continuum
of islands. Following the literature, the concept of optimism and pessimism is de-
fined on the agents’ one-period ahead forecasting error about the persistent shocks.
Definition 3.6
Let ξit ≡ θt−Eit−1θt be the time t−1 forecast error of the agents on island i about the
persistent shock in period t, and ξt ≡
∫
ξitdi = θt − E¯t−1θt be the economy average
forecast error, where E¯t−1θt =
∫
E(θt|F it−1)di. The economy is optimistic about θ if
ξt < 0; they are pessimistic about the shock if ξt > 0.
Similar to the previous discussion, to highlight the learning effect, I still use
the results from the full information model as the benchmark. It is easy to show
that if agents have full information about the economy, on each island i the agents’
forecast errors are the same and serially uncorrelated. Thus, the forecast errors of
the economy are i.i.d., that is,
ξt = vt,∀t.
However, if information is incomplete and signals are not fully revealing, then
the economy average forecast errors are serially correlated. Appendix B.6 shows, for
the no public signal case, the forecast errors follow an ARMA(2,1) process; for the
exogenous public signal case, they follow an ARMA(2,2) process. For the endoge-
nous public signal model and the exogenous public signal model where information
is fully revealed with one period lag, the forecast errors are both governed by the
MA(1) process.
3.4.5 Loan-to-Value Ratio
Define the loan-to-value ratio on island i at each time t as
τ it ≡
Bit+1
QitL
i
t+1
.
Log-linearise τ around the steady-state, I have
τˆ it = Eitqit+1 − qit.
which is simply the difference between the expected future land price and current
land price. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint hold with equality
and they will use all their net worth to finance the difference between the price
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of land and the amount they can borrow against each unit of land, i.e. the down
payment. Hence, the lower the down payment lenders require, the more the land
entrepreneurs will buy. In terms of the loan-to-value ratio, the high the ratio τˆ it , the
more land entrepreneurs on island i can buy. This will be true when the households
on island i have higher expected future land price given the current price.
The previous analysis then implies that the high (low) expectation might be
driven by noises. Lenders have optimistic expectations about future land price not
only because current and future productivity shocks are expected to be high, but
also because they are confused about the true state of the world and mistakenly
take the noise in the public signals as a fundamental shock. Hence, noises generate
sizable and persistent effect on the macroeconomy in a way that is different from the
true productivity shocks described in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); in their model,
productivity shock generates effects by initializing a change in constrained firms’
net worth, while noises in this model effect through lenders’ (as well as borrowers’)
expectation induced by some public signal.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduce dispersed information and collateral constraints into a
Real Business Cycle model. I show that noises may have real impacts on the macroe-
conomy, which is induced by learning and amplified by the collateral effect. More
specifically, I incorporate Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) mechanism into an “islands
economy” where agents on a continuum of islands have dispersed information about
the aggregate productivity shock. As agents on each island cannot tell the aggre-
gate shock apart from the island-specific idiosyncratic productivity shock, they use
both privately observed signals and noisy public signals to make optimal inferences.
When information is not fully revealed, I show noises in the public signals can be
important sources of macroeconomic fluctuations.
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Chapter 4
News Shocks, Housing Prices,
and Consumption
4.1 Introduction
Aggregate time series data from many countries clearly show there is a strong co-
movement between housing price change and consumption change. These facts have
attracted a lot of attention among economists and policy makers, and lead them to
ask the questions: What is the relationship between housing price and consumption?
How do housing prices affect consumer spending?
Under the life-cycle hypothesis, a natural explanation is attributed to the
“wealth effect”, and there are a bunch of papers finding significant sizes of marginal
propensity to consume out of housing wealth. The most influential ones might be
Case et.al. (2005) who use the aggregate data and Campbell and Cocco (2007) who
use the household level data.
Nonetheless, the wealth effect explanation has been challenged for both its
theoretical underpinning (Buiter, 2008) and the empirical estimations. One of the
arguments is that at the aggregate level housing wealth effect may not be significant,
even though it may be large from the household perspective. This is because there
are both winners and losers in the housing market. While homeowners may increase
their consumption in response to the housing price appreciation, those who want to
get on or up the property ladder may be forced to reduce consumption. Therefore,
the overall effect will depend on the distribution of winners and losers in the housing
market, and their responses to house price changes.
Other economists, such as Iacoviello (2005), therefore argue for the collateral
effect to explain the strong co-movement between the two series. The idea is that
housing is often used as the collateral to borrow funds, and when the price becomes
higher, credit constrained homeowners can borrow more to finance consumption
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spending.
The co-movement between housing price and consumption may also be driven
by the common factors, especially those unobservable factors such as the news about
future productivity (King, 1990). Attanasio et.al. (2009) study the same household
level data as that in Campbell and Cocco (2007), but conclude that it is the common
factors instead of wealth effect that explain the co-movement.
This chapter tends to support the common factors view as argued by e.g.
Attanasio and Weber (1994) and Attanasio et.al. (2009). In contrast to the previous
papers which indirectly show the point using household level data, this chapter
explicitly identifies the most suspected common factor. More specifically, I use
the aggregate time series data from the United Kingdom and the Structural Vector
Autoregression (SVAR) methodology to identify productivity shock and news about
future productivity shock.
While it is not possible to disentangle the different effect channels discussed
above using the macroeconomic data and SVAR methodology, I am able to quantify
the importance of common factors in explaining the co-movement between housing
price and consumption. My empirical estimation of the U.K. data delivers two find-
ings: (1) most of the positive co-movement between housing price and consumption
comes from current productivity shock and news shock about future productivity;
(2) the shock that moves the vast majority of housing price barely moves consump-
tion. These two findings thus cast doubt on the importance of wealth effect in
explaining the striking co-movement of housing price and consumption.
4.2 An Illustrative Model
Before I show the empirical part, I first show an illustrative model in this section. I
should emphasise that, while the model reflects my understanding about the ques-
tion and motivates my empirical strategy, the empirical analysis that follows is not
an estimation of the model.
Consider an economy populated by a large number (Lt) of identical individual
consumers in which the only assets are a set of identical infinitely-lived trees and a
set of identical infinitely-lived houses. Consumers have infinite horizons. Aggregate
output equals the fruit of the trees and service flows of housing, neither of which can
be stored. Assume that in a given year, each tree produces exactly the same amount
of fruit as every other tree, but the total harvest output of fruit per tree dt varies
from year to year depending on the weather. Each house produces exactly the same
amount of housing services as every other house and the total services per house is
constant and normalised to be one. Each consumer owns the same number of trees
and houses. The aggregate stock of trees is Kt and aggregate stock of housing is
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Ht. Each consumer, for given k−1, h−1, solves the problem
max
{ct,st,kt,ht}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ct) + θtw(st)],
s.t.
ct + rtst + ptkt + qtht = (pt + dt)kt−1 + (qt + rt)ht−1,∀t,
where ct is the consumption of fruit per person in t and u(ct) is the utility by
consuming fruit ct, st is the consumption of housing service per person in t and
w(st) is the utility derived from st, rt is the price of housing service in t, pt is the
price of a tree in t, qt is the the price of a house in t, kt is the quantity of trees held
per person in t, ht is the quantity of houses held per person in t, β is consumer’s
discount factor, and θt is consumer’s preference parameter for housing services. The
first-order conditions to the consumer’s problem are given by
θt
rt
=
u′(ct)
w′(st)
,
pt = βEt
[
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(dt+1 + pt+1)
]
,
qt = βEt
[
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(rt+1 + qt+1)
]
.
Forward-looking iterations give the celebrated pricing formulas for both the tree and
the house
pt = Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
u′(ct)
u′(ct+j)
dt+j ,
qt = Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
u′(ct)
u′(ct+j)
rt+j .
There are four markets to be cleared: (1) fruit market: ctLt = dtKt; (2)
housing rental market: stLt = Ht; (3) trees market: ktLt = Kt; and (4) housing
market htLt = Ht. If I normalise so that Lt = 1 and Kt = 1, these markets clearing
conditions become ct = dt, st = Ht, kt = 1, ht = Ht. If I further assume u(ct) = ln ct
and w(st) = ln st, then the house pricing formula can be written as
qt = Et
∞∑
j=1
βj
θt+j
Ht+j
dt.
Hence, in this simple endowment economy, non-housing consumption (fruit)
change is completely exogenous, while housing price is determined by the preference
shock, housing supply, and fruit production. I take this extreme stand in order to
60
show that in a general equilibrium model with homogeneous consumers, the housing
wealth effect concept could be misleading. The co-movement may reflect a reversed
causality from consumption to housing price.
To introduce the information structure and see how the news about future
productivity change affects these variables, I assume the productivity process for
each fruit tree as follows
ln dt = ρ ln dt−1 + v1,t−1 + v2,t,
where v1,t−1 is the news shock observed in period t − 1 about the productivity
change that will realise in period t, and v2,t is the productivity shock in period t.
Other things equal, productivity shock and news shock will drive housing price and
consumption to move in the same direction.
In the following section, I identify the news shock and productivity shock
based on the estimation of a three-variable vector autoregression (VAR) model.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
4.3.1 Structural Vector Autoregression Model
Consider a k-dimensional time series Yt, where t = 1, . . . , T . Assume Yt can be
approximated by a structural vector autoregression model of finite order p as below
B(L)Yt = ut, (4.1)
where B(L) ≡ B0 −B1L−B2L2 − · · · −BpLp is the autoregressive lag order poly-
nomial1, and the variance-covariance matrix of structural error term is normalised
such that
E(utu
′
t) ≡ Σu = Ik.
The normalisation implies that, a unit innovation in the structural shocks is of size
one standard deviation by construction.
A reduced form of the model can be derived by pre-multiplying both sides
of equation (4.1) by B−10 . That is,
A(L)Yt = t, (4.2)
where A(L) ≡ I − A1L − A2L2 − · · · − ApLp, As ≡ B−10 Bs, s = 1, . . . , p, and t ≡
B−10 ut. The standard estimation methods allow us to obtain consistent estimates
of the reduced-form parameters As, the errors t, and their covariance matrix Σ.
1All deterministic regressors have been suppressed for notational convenience.
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By recovering the elements of B−10 from the estimates of reduced form parameters,
the coefficient matrices of the structural equation can be constructed by using the
relation Bs ≡ B0As, and the desired structural shocks may be obtained.
Note that there could be numerous possible sets of structural shocks. To see
this, let Bˆ−10 be the Cholesky decomposition of Σ. Then, any B˜
−1
0 ≡ Bˆ−10 Q and
u˜t ≡ Q′uˆt can be candidate orthogonalisation and candidate structural shocks. It
is then essential to impose reasonable restrictions to identify the desired structural
shocks.
4.3.2 Identification Strategy
I aim to identify two types of shocks: the productivity shock and news shock about
future productivity. The identification strategy is similar to that in Barsky and
Sims (2011) and Uhlig (2003). Specifically, I first identify two orthogonal shocks
that best explain the sum of forecast error variance of productivity at all horizons.
I then distinguish the two shocks by restricting no contemporaneous effect of news
shock on productivity. In the first step, I followed Barsky and Sims (2011) and
truncated the horizon to 40 periods.2
To find out shocks that account for the variation of a particular variable as
much as possible turns out to be the same as finding eigenvectors corresponding to
the largest eigenvalues of some matrix. To see this, write Yt in the vector moving
average (VMA) representations
Yt =
∞∑
s=0
θˆsuˆt−s =
∞∑
s=0
θ˜su˜t−s,
where uˆ’s are the structural shocks obtained from the Cholesky decomposition, and
u˜’s are the structural shocks obtained from any arbitrary orthogonalisation. Given
all the data up to and including t, the h-step forecast error of Yt+h is
∑h−1
s=0 θˆsuˆt+h−s
which is equal to
∑h−1
s=0 θˆs(Qu˜t+h−s). The forecast error variance-covariance matrix
is thus given by
∑h−1
s=0 [θˆsQ][θˆsQ]
′, with the off-diagonal elements being replaced by
zeros. This matrix can be further decomposed as
k∑
j=1
h−1∑
s=0
[θˆsqj ][θˆsqj ]
′,
where qj is the j
th column of Q, k is the dimension of the system, and h = 1 · · · .
Identifying the shock j that best explains the forecast error variance of variable i
2This looks quite arbitrary but a sensitivity check shows that the choice turns out to have little
impact on the results once it is large enough.
62
from period H + 1 to H is equivalent to doing the maximisation problem below
maxσ2(H,H; qj) =
H∑
h−1=H
h−1∑
s=0
[θˆsqj ][θˆsqj ]
′
ii = q
′
jSiqj ,
subject to
q′jqj = 1,
where [θˆsqj ][θˆsqj ]
′
ii denotes the (i, i)
th element in [θˆsqj ][θˆsqj ]
′, and
Si =
H∑
h−1=H
h−1∑
s=0
(θˆis)
′θˆis =
H∑
s=0
(θˆis)
′θˆis +
H+1∑
s=0
(θˆis)
′θˆis + ...+
H∑
s=0
(θˆis)
′θˆis,
where θˆis denotes the i
th row of θˆs. Solving the Lagrangian problem
maxL(qj , λ) = q
′
jSiqj − λ(q′jqj − 1),
I have the first-order necessary condition
2Siq
∗
j = 2λq
∗
j ,
from which we can see that the solution to qj lies in the set of eigenvectors of Si.
Combining with the constraint q′jqj = 1, I have the maximum value
σ2max(H,H; qj) = (q
∗
j )
′Siq∗j = (q
∗
j )
′λq∗j = λ(q
∗
j )
′q∗j = λ.
This implies that q∗j is just the eigenvector with the maximal eigenvalue λ.
3
The above analysis can be easily generalised if one wants to identify multiple
shocks that best explain the forecast error variance of variable i. In this case,
the maximum value of σ2 will be the sum of largest eigenvalues in λ. Then one
can get the corresponding eigenvectors. However, the eigenvectors are not unique
for maximizing σ2.4 In other words, one can find many (numerous) sets of two
orthogonal shocks that give the same maximised total forecast error variance of
variable i at the horizon H. Therefore, one needs to impose other restrictions to
distinguish those shocks.
3Since the maximum σ2 is just λ and to get the maximum value is equivalent to choose the
largest value from {λ}, and thus the corresponding eigenvector is the solution. Si is something
I can compute from the reduced VAR and the eigenvalues and eigenvectors to it can be easily
obtained using Matlab.
4See Uglig(2003) for detail.
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4.3.3 Data and VAR Estimation
The primitive data are from the U.K. Office for National Statistics, including nomi-
nal housing price, labour productivity, non-durable goods and service, durable good-
s, GDP deflator, and population. They are quarterly data covering the period of
1971-2011. I use these data to obtain the four series of variables: housing price,
labour productivity, non-durable consumption good, and durable consumption good;
all are in real per capita terms. The data in the VAR model are first-order differ-
ences of the log values of those transformed data. I estimate the model for both
non-durable goods and durable goods respectively, but my analysis in the following
section focuses mainly on the results of non-durable goods case.
All the data series in the sample are stationary, tested by the Dicky-Fuller
method. For both cases (durable goods and non-durable goods) the order of VAR is
of one, which is based on a combination of information criteria and serial correlation
tests. With a stationary system, I can write the VAR model into a vector moving
average model with structural shocks∆hpt∆dt
∆ct
 = ∞∑
s=0
θ
hp
news θ
hp
un θ
hp
3
θdnews θ
d
un θ
d
3
θcnews θ
c
un θ
c
3

s
v1v2
v3

t−s
,
where hpt, dt and ct denote the log level of housing price, log level of labour pro-
ductivity and log level of consumption, respectively; ∆ is the first-order difference
operator; v1 denotes the shock that has a delayed effect on productivity but perfectly
predicted by the consumers, i.e. news shock, v2 denotes the shock that affects pro-
ductivity contemporaneously, v3 can be interpreted as a combination of preference
shock and housing supply shock. θs are impulse responses of variables to shocks.
4.4 Results
As the basis of the analysis, I show the forecast error variance decompositions,
impulse response functions, and conditional correlations. Forecast error variance
decompositions show the relative importance of each shock to each variable, Impulse
response functions tell the magnitude and persistence of each variable to each shock.
Conditional correlations show what the correlation between two variables would be
if only one of the shocks were at work.
4.4.1 Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Table 4.1 and 4.2 show the forecast error variance decompositions. For non-durable
consumption goods, we can see that for the horizon of 40 periods, 99.91% of forecast
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error variance of the productivity growth rate is explained by the two shocks. This
is not surprising given that this is just how I identify the shocks. However, the ma-
jor contribution comes from unexpected productivity shock (0.55% versus 99.36%).
The two shocks also explain a very large proportion (81.97%) of the forecast error
variance of non-durable consumption growth rate. In contrast to the labour pro-
ductivity, however, a larger contribution comes from the news shock (65.72% versus
16.25%). This implies that the predicted productivity shock plays a dominant role
in changing non-durable consumption. As for the housing prices, the two shocks can
only explain less than half of the forecast error variation of housing price growth
rate. The vast majority of housing price variation comes from Shock 3, which only
accounts a small proportion of forecast error variance in consumption. Similar to
the case of consumption, news shocks explain a larger part than the current pro-
ductivity shock (42.49% vs 3.83%). For the durable goods consumption model, the
results are quite similar.
Table 4.1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Non-durable Goods
H=40 housing price productivity non-durable
news shock 42.49 0.55 65.72
productivity shock 3.83 99.36 16.25
subsum 46.32 99.91 81.97
shock 3 53.68 0.09 18.03
Table 4.2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition: Durable Goods
H=40 housing price productivity durable
news shock 17.99 1.48 79.5
productivity shock 3.78 98.4 14.55
subsum 21.76 99.84 94.04
shock 3 78.24 0.16 5.96
4.4.2 Impulse Response Functions
The three panels in Figure 4.1 show the impulse response functions for (the level of)
housing price, labour productivity, and non-durable goods consumption to each of
the shocks. It can be seen that all variables are permanently affected by productivity
shock and news shock. The magnitudes and dynamics, however, are quite different.
Productivity shock has larger effects on labour productivity but smaller effect
on consumption and housing price. Labour productivity responds to unexpected
productivity more than nine times than that to the news shock. In contrast, the
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response of housing price to news shock is about as four times large as that to the
productivity shock. Similarly, the response of consumption to news shock is about
as two times large as that to the productivity shock.
The third shock has a significantly large effect on housing prices but statis-
tically insignificant effect on productivity. On the other hand, the effect of shock 3
on consumption is negative in the short run and negligible effect in the long run.
4.4.3 Conditional Correlations
Table 4.3 shows the unconditional and conditional correlations. For non-durable
good, the unconditional correlation coefficient between housing price and consump-
tion is 0.38. A further decomposition shows that the correlation between housing
price and consumption is more strongly positive (both are over 0.8) when condi-
tional on news shock or productivity shock. This suggests that the importance of
productivity shock and news shock in driving housing prices and consumption to
co-move. In contrast, the correlation of the two becomes negative when conditional
on the third shock, which is consistent with the results from impulse response func-
tions. That is, the most important shock behind the movement of housing prices, in
fact, has a dampening effect on consumption, causing a negative correlation between
housing price and consumption.
Table 4.3: Conditional Correlations between Housing Price and Consumption
H=40; 1971Q2-2011Q4 non-durable durable
on news shock 0.82 0.64
on productivity shock 0.86 0.31
on shock 3 -0.40 0.08
unconditional 0.38 0.60
4.4.4 Summary
Based on these results, I have two important findings that cast doubts on the housing
wealth effect on household consumption. First, both housing price and consumption
respond strongly to the productivity shock and news shock. While the two shocks
together drive less than half of housing price variation, they drive more than 80%
of the consumption variation. The correlations between the two series conditional
on the productivity shock and news shock are both strongly positive, implying that
the co-movement of housing price and consumption comes from productivity shock
and news shock. Second, while more than half of the variations in housing price
comes from the third shock, that shock has small (18.03% in forecast error variance)
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and negative effect (negative impulse response function and negative conditional
correlation) on non-durable consumption.
4.5 Historical Decompositions
In this section, I implement counterfactual experiments to assess the contributions
of each shock to housing prices and consumption in the sample history. Specifically,
I feed in only shock each time to see how housing prices and consumption would
have been. Figure 4.2 presents the historical decompositions; the lines around the
x-axis are the differences between data and simulation.
The first panel shows that, if there were no news shocks how would house
prices and non-durable goods consumption have behaved. For instance, they both
would have been much lower between the year 1998 and 2009 without new shocks.
This implies that news shocks were playing a prominent role in the recent housing
market boom. In contrast, in the earlier years especially the fifteen years between
1974 and 1989 when housing prices fluctuated significantly, news shocks decreased
housing prices. Households in that period must have seen negative news about
future productivity and thereby decreased demand for houses. Interestingly, news
shocks didn’t seem to be important after the market crash in 1989. The historical
effects of news shocks on consumption display a similar pattern as on housing prices.
The second panel shows that, if there were no current productivity shocks
how would house prices and non-durable goods consumption have behaved. Produc-
tivity shocks had been playing a trivial role in housing price dynamics before 1991,
they significantly helped drive the recent housing market boom; without productiv-
ity shocks, housing prices would have been much lower. Again, the historical effects
of the productivity shock on consumption display a similar pattern as on housing
prices.
The importance of the third shock in sample history is shown on the third
panel. This shock contributed to the housing boom between 1971 and 1990. This
shock dragged housing price during 1991-2004. It played important roles in the first
three boom-busts in the sample history, but not in the recent one (2004-2009). It
was responsible for the housing market crash in the late 1980s. Despite its dramatic
impacts on housing prices, this third shock just looks like noises to the consumption:
without it, consumption in the whole sample history barely changed.
Consistent with forecast error variance decompositions, the historical decom-
positions also show that the third shock was important to housing prices but not
important to consumption.
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4.6 Conclusion
The housing wealth effect is believed by many to have driven the strong co-movement
between housing prices and consumption. However, the (real) housing price is sim-
ply the relative price of housing to the non-housing consumption good, thus an
appreciation of housing price is just a reflection of an increase in the production of
the non-housing consumption good relative to houses. Under this explanation, it is
the increase of non-housing consumption good production that drives the increase
in housing prices; the causality implied by the wealth effect is reversed. This idea
has been shown in a simple house asset pricing model in this chapter.
Because the direction of causality can be in either way, empirical research
using aggregate data and single equation Ordinary Least Squares estimation is vul-
nerable to the endogeneity problem; the estimate based on this type of research can
be seriously biased. Instrument variable estimation or simultaneous equation mod-
els can be used to overcome this problem. However, neither instrument variables
nor truly exogenous variables, which are required in those methods, are easy to find.
To circumvent these difficulties, I adopt the structural vector autoregression method
in this chapter and implement a novel strategy to identify the productivity shock
and the news shock about future productivity. The third shock that is not specifi-
cally labelled but implicitly identified has been found important to the variation of
housing prices. The news shock and productivity shock are found to be the main
drivers behind the co-movement between housing price and consumption. While not
being able to directly estimate the wealth effect or collateral effect, the results from
my empirical exercise cast doubt on the importance of housing wealth in affecting
household consumption.
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Figure 4.1: Impulse Response Functions
Note: dotted lines are the confidence intervals.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proofs
Definition A1: (First Order Stochastic Dominance)
Let Θ be a subset of R, representing possible values of the random parameter θ˜. A distribu-
tion G1 is said to dominate G2 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance if for every
increasing function U(·), we have ∫ U(θ)dG1(θ) > ∫ U(θ)dG2(θ). (Milgrom, 1981, p.382)
Lemma A1:
G1 dominates G2 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance if and only if G1(θ) ≤
G2(θ), ∀θ, with strict inequality for some value of θ.
Proof : see Milgrom (1981, p.382). 
Proof of Lemma 2.1:
(1) First note that the joint distribution of s˜ and a˜ is given by
fs˜,a˜(s, a) = fs˜(s)fa˜(a) =
1
piσsσa
exp
(
− s
2
2σ2s
− a
2
2σ2a
)
,
where a ∈ R, s ∈ R−;σa > 0, σs > 0 and where I have used the fact that w˜ and a˜ are
independent from each other and their density functions
fa˜(a) =
1√
2piσa
exp
(
− a
2
2σ2a
)
, a ∈ R,
fs˜(s) =
√
2√
piσs
exp
(
− s
2
2σ2s
)
, s ∈ R−.
Since x˜ = w− 1λ s˜ and y˜ = a˜− s˜, I am able to obtain the joint distribution fx˜,y˜|w˜(x, y|w) as
fx˜,y˜|w˜(x, y|w) = |J | · fs˜,a˜|w˜ {λ(w − x), λw − λx+ y}
=
λ
piσsσa
exp
[
−λ
2(w − x)2
2σ2s
− (λw − λx+ y)
2
2σ2a
]
, x ≥ w, y ∈ R, w ∈ R,
where
J ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂s∂x ∂s∂y∂a
∂x
∂a
∂y
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣−λ 0−λ 1
∣∣∣∣∣ = −λ.
Given the independence assumption about w˜i, a˜ and s˜, the joint density of w˜i, x˜, y˜ condi-
tional on w˜ = w can be obtained as
fw˜i,x˜,y˜|w˜(wi, x, y|w) = fw˜i|w˜(wi|w)fx˜,y˜|w˜(x, y|w) = λe−λ(wi−w) · fx˜,y˜|w˜(x, y|w)
=
λ2
piσsσa
exp
[
−λ(wi − w)− λ
2(w − x)2
2σ2s
− (λw − λx+ y)
2
2σ2a
]
, x ≥ w, y ∈ R, wi ≥ w,w ∈ R.
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By the multiplication rule, the joint distribution of w˜i, x˜, y˜, w˜ is given by
fw˜i,x˜,y˜,w˜(wi, x, y, w) = fw˜i,x˜,y˜|w˜(wi, x, y|w)fw˜(w)
= fw˜i,x˜,y˜|w˜(wi, x, y|w) ·
[
1
σw
√
2pi
exp
(
− w
2
2σ2w
)]
=
λ2
pi
√
2piσsσaσw
exp
[
−λ(wi − w)− λ
2(w − x)2
2σ2s
− (λw − λx+ y)
2
2σ2a
− w
2
2σ2w
]
≡ N · exp[−(β2w2 + β1(x, y)w + β0(x, y, wi))], x ≥ w, y ∈ R, wi ≥ w,w ∈ R,
where N ≡ λ2√
2pipiσsσaσw
, and
β2 ≡ 1
2
(
λ2
σ2a
+
λ2
σ2s
+
1
σ2w
)
,
β1 ≡ −λ
(
λx− y
σ2a
+ 1 +
λx
σ2s
)
,
β0 ≡ 1
2
[
λ2x2
σ2s
+
(λx− y)2
σ2a
]
+ λwi.
From the Bayes’ theorem, I have the posterior density of w˜ conditional on w˜i = wi, x˜ = x
and y˜ = y as
fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|wi, x, y) =
fw˜i,x˜,y˜,w˜(wi, x, y, w)∫
fw˜i,x˜,y˜,w˜(wi, x, y, w
′)dw′
.
If wi < x, i.e. the signal of agent i is smaller than wˇ, then
1
N
∫
fw˜i,x˜,y˜,w˜(wi, x, y, w
′)dw′ =
∫ wi
−∞
exp[−(β2w′2 + β1w′ + β0)]dw′
=
√
pi
β2
exp
(
β21
4β2
− β0
)
Φ
(√
2β2wi +
β1√
2β2
)
,
and the cumulative distribution function is
Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|wi, x, y) =
∫ w
−∞ exp[−(β2w′2 + β1w′ + β0)]dw′∫ wi
−∞ exp[−(β2w′2 + β1w′ + β0)]dw′
=
Φ
(√
2β2w +
β1√
2β2
)
Φ
(√
2β2wi +
β1√
2β2
) = Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
wi−µ(x,y)
σ
) ,
where
σ ≡ 1√
2β2
=
(
λ2
σ2a
+
λ2
σ2s
+
1
σ2w
)− 12
,
µ ≡ − β1
2β2
=
(
λx− y
σ2a
+
λx
σ2s
+ 1
)
λσ2.
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If wi ≥ x, i.e. the signal of agent i is equal or larger than wˇ, then
1
N
∫
fw˜i,x˜,y˜,w˜(wi, x, y, w
′)dw′ =
∫ x
−∞
exp[−(β2w′2 + β1w′ + β0)]dw′,
Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|wi, x, y) =
Φ
(√
2β2w +
β1√
2β2
)
Φ
(√
2β2x+
β1√
2β2
) = Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ(x,y)
σ
) .
(2) It is straightforward to see that Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|wi, x, y) ≤ Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|wj , x, y) for all w if
wi > wj , since Φ(·) is an increasing function. This implies that, given price signals x and
y, agent who receives signal wi will have higher or equal expectation about w than agent
who receives signal wj . Because house resale value is an increasing function of w, agent who
receives signal wi will have higher or equal expectations about house resale value than that
of agent who receives signal wj .
(3) This follows immediately from (1), that is, the posterior distribution of w˜ is conditional
on w˜i = x, x˜ = x and y˜ = y:
Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y) =
Φ
(
w−µ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ(x,y)
σ
) . 
Proof of Theorem 2.1:
The equilibrium housing price function is obtained by using the cut-off agent’s posterior
belief: Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y) in the indifference condition:
P = Q+
1
R
∫ +∞
−∞
h(w)dFw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y). 
Lemma A2:
Define Φˆ(u) ≡ Φ(u)φ(u) , where φ(u) = 1√2pi e−
u2
2 and Φ(u) =
∫ u
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
u2
2 du. Φˆ(u) is increas-
ing in u, i.e. ∂Φˆ(u)∂u ≥ 0.
Proof:
∂ Φ(u)φ(u)
∂u
=
φ(u)φ(u)− ∂φ(u)∂u Φ(u)
(φ(u))2
=
φ(u)φ(u) + uφ(u)Φ(u)
(φ(u))2
=
φ(u)[φ(u) + uΦ(u)]
(φ(u))2
.
Since φ(u) > 0,∀u, I only need to show that φ(u) + uΦ(u) ≥ 0. But
φ(u) + uΦ(u) = φ(u) +
∫ u
−∞
uφ(t)dt ≥ φ(u) +
∫ u
−∞
tφ(t)dt = φ(u)− φ(t)|u−∞ = 0.
This lemma will be useful in the following proofs. 
Proof of Claim 2.1:
From Theorem 2.1, I have P = Q+ V (x, y). Since Q = ey, it suffices to show that V (x, y)
is increasing in x for fixed y = lnQ. Because V is the expectation of an increasing function
of the random variable w˜, conditional on the realisations of x˜ and y˜, it then suffices to
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show the conditional distribution Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y) is decreasing in x for fixed y. Define
g1(w, x, y) ≡ w−µ(x,y)σ and g2(x, y) ≡ x−µ(x,y)σ . Then, I have Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y) = Φ(g1)Φ(g2) ,
where g1 =
w
σ − σ
[
λ(λx−y)
σ2a
+ λ+ λ
2
σ2s
x
]
, g2 = σ
(
1
σ2w
x+ λσ2a
y − λ
)
. Note that
∂Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y)
∂x
= [Φ(g2)]
−2
[
Φ(g2)φ(g1)
∂g1
∂x
− Φ(g1)φ(g2)∂g2
∂x
]
,
where Φ(gi) > 0, φ(gi) > 0 for i = 1, 2, g1 ≤ g2, and
∂g1
∂x
= −σλ2
(
1
σ2a
+
1
σ2s
)
< 0,
∂g2
∂x
=
σ
σ2w
> 0.
Hence,
∂Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x,x,y)
∂x < 0 for g1 < g2, and for any Pf = h(w) that is increasing in w,
this implies V ≡ E(P˜f |w˜i = x, x˜ = x, y˜ = y) is strictly increasing in x. 
Proof of Corollary 2.1:
Substituting h(w) = ew into the price function in Theorem 2.1, we have
P = ey +
∫ x
−∞ exp{−[β2w2 + (β1 − 1)w + β0]}dw[ √
pi√
β2
exp
(
β21
4β2
− β0
)]
Φ
(√
2β2x+
β1√
2β2
)
= ey +
[ √
pi√
β2
exp
(
(β1−1)2
4β2
− β0
)]
Φ
(√
2β2x+
β1−1√
2β2
)
[ √
pi√
β2
exp
(
β21
4β2
− β0
)]
Φ
(√
2β2x+
β1√
2β2
)
= ey + exp
(
1− 2β1
4β2
)
Φ
(
x−µ
σ − σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ
σ
)
≡ ey + exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ
)
Φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ)
,
where
κ ≡ x− µ
σ
=
(
1
σ2w
x+
λ
σ2a
y − λ
)
σ. 
Assumption for Interior Solution:
Note that the consumption in the second period is given by Ci = R[Mi − PHi + Q(Hi −
Bi)]+PfHi = RMi−Ai+
[
Pf −
∫ +∞
−∞ h(w)fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y)dw
]
Hi. For Ci ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [0, 1],
it is sufficient to assume
Mi ≥ 1
R
[
Ai +
∫ +∞
−∞
h(w)fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y)dw − h(w)
]
.
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
From Lemma 2.2, I have the joint density of x˜ and y˜ conditional on w˜ = w as
fx˜,y˜|w˜(x, y|w) = λ
piσsσa
exp
[
−λ
2(w − x)2
2σ2s
− (λw − λx+ y)
2
2σ2a
]
.
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The joint density of x˜, y˜, and w˜ is then given by
fx˜,y˜,w˜(x, y, w) = fx˜,y˜|w˜(x, y|w) · fw˜(w) = Nˆ · exp[−(β2w2 + βˆ1w + βˆ0)],
where w ∈ R, x ≥ w, y ∈ R, Nˆ ≡ λ√
2pipiσsσaσw
, βˆ1 = β1 + λ, and βˆ0 = β0 − λwi. From the
Bayes’ theorem, I have the posterior distribution of w˜ conditional on x˜ = x and y˜ = y
Fw˜|x˜,y˜(w|x, y) =
∫ w
−∞ fx˜,y˜,w˜(x, y, w
′)dw′∫ x
−∞ fx˜,y˜,w˜(x, y, w
′)dw′
=
Φ
(√
2β2w +
β1+λ√
2β2
)
Φ
(√
2β2x+
β1+λ√
2β2
) = Φ
(
w−µˆ(x,y)
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µˆ(x,y)
σ
) ,
where µˆ(x, y) ≡ −β1+λ2β2 = µ(x, y)− λσ2 < µ(x, y). Denote g(µ) ≡
Φ(w−µσ )
Φ( x−µσ )
. We can see that
∂g(µ)
∂µ
= −φ(
w−µ
σ )φ(
x−µ
σ )
σ[Φ(x−µσ )]
2
[
Φ(x−µσ )
φ(x−µσ )
− Φ(
w−µ
σ )
φ(w−µσ )
]
≤ 0,∀w.
Thus, g(µ) ≤ g(µˆ) or Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y) ≤ Fw˜|x˜,y˜(w|x, y), with strict inequality for some
value of w. As Pf is increasing in w, then E(P˜f |w˜i = x, x˜ = x, y˜ = y) > E(P˜f |x˜ = x, y˜ = y)
and thereby Dˆ > 0,∀(x, y) ∈ R2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
For Pf = e
w, the market expected house resale value is given by
V (w, a, s) = exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ
)
Φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ)
.
If I take the random variables a, s, w as being deterministic, and take the partial derivatives
with respect to each of them, I have
∂V
∂s
= V σ
{
−
[
λσ
σ2s
+
1
λ
(
1
σ2w
+
λ2
σ2a
)(
φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ− σ) −
φ(κ)
Φ(κ)
)]}
,
∂V
∂w
= V σ
{
λ2σ
(
1
σ2a
+
1
σ2s
)
+
1
σ2w
[
φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ− σ) −
φ(κ)
Φ(κ)
]}
,
∂V
∂a
= V σ
{
λ
σ2a
[
φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ− σ) −
φ(κ)
Φ(κ)
− σ
]}
.
As φ(κ−σ)Φ(κ−σ) − φ(κ)Φ(κ) > 0 from Lemma A2, it’s easy to see that ∂V∂w > 0 and ∂V∂s < 0. For
∂V
∂a , since
∂V
∂y =
∂V
∂a and from Proposition 2.3 we know
∂V
∂y must be negative, it follows
immediately that ∂V∂a < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
Similar to the proof of Claim 2.1, I first take the partial derivative of Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y)
w.r.t. y
∂Fw˜|w˜i,x˜,y˜(w|x, x, y)
∂y
=
φ(g1)φ(g2)
[Φ(g2)]2
∂g1
∂y
[
Φ(g2)
φ(g2)
− Φ(g1)
φ(g1)
]
,
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where the second equality comes from the fact that ∂g1∂y =
∂g2
∂y =
λσ
σ2a
> 0. For g1 < g2,
the term in the bracket is positive from Lemma A2. Thus, for g1 < g2,
∂F
∂y > 0. As
Pf = h(w) is increasing in w, E(P˜f |w˜i = x, x˜ = x, y˜ = y) is strictly decreasing in y, i.e.
∂E(P˜f |w˜i=x,x˜=x,y˜=y)
∂y > 0, and
∂E(P˜f |w˜i=x,x˜=x,y˜=y)
∂Q =
∂E(P˜f |w˜i=x,x˜=x,y˜=y)
∂y
∂y
∂Q < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
Taking expectation of RH conditional on the econometrician’s information set yields
E(R˜H |Ωe) = E(P˜f |Ωe) +Q− P,
where E(P˜f |Ωe) = E(P˜f |x˜ = x, y˜ = y) = Vˆ . From Theorem 2.1, I have
P = Q+ V.
Hence, E(R˜H |Ωe) = Vˆ − V = −Dˆ where −Dˆ is defined in Proposition 2.1. 
Proof of Corollary 2.2:
From Proposition 2.1, I have
Fw˜|x˜,y˜(w|x, y) =
Φ
(
w−µˆ
σ
)
Φ
(
x−µˆ
σ
) .
The expected house resale value conditional based on this posterior probability can then be
obtained as
Vˆ ≡ E(P˜f |x˜ = x, y˜ = y) = exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ− λσ2
)
Φ(κ− σ + λσ)
Φ(κ+ λσ)
.
It thus follows immediately that the conditional return on only housing price and retnal
price is given by
E(R˜H |Ωe) = exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ− λσ2
)
Φ(κ+ λσ − σ)
Φ(κ+ λσ)
− exp
(
σ2
2
+ µ
)
Φ(κ− σ)
Φ(κ)
. 
Proof of Corollary 2.3:
E
[
Dˇ(x, y)
]
= E
[
V (x, y)− Vˇ (x, y)] = E[V (x, y)]− E[Vˇ (x, y)]
= E[V (x, y)]− E[Vˆ (x, y)] = E
[
V (x, y)− Vˆ (x, y)
]
= E[Dˆ(x, y)] > 0.
The third equality comes from the law of iterated expectations, and the last inequality holds
because from Proposition 2.1, I have Dˆ(x, y) > 0 for all (x, y) ∈ R2 when Pf is increasing
in w. 
A.2 Derivations
(1) Housing Prices Conditional on Private Signal and x˜ = x:
Since the private signal conditional on w is given by fw˜i|w˜(wi|w) = λe−λ(wi−w), wi ≥ w, and
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the probability density of x˜ conditional on w˜ = w is fx˜|w˜(x|w) =
√
2λ√
piσs
exp
[
−λ2(w−x)22σ2s
]
, x ≥
w,w ∈ R, the joint density of x˜ and wi conditional on w is
fw˜i,x˜|w˜(wi, x|w) = fw˜i|w˜(wi|w)fx˜|w˜(x|w)
=
λ2
√
2√
piσs
exp
[
−λ
2(x− w)2
2σ2s
− λ(wi − w)
]
, x ≥ w,wi ≥ w,w ∈ R,
due to the conditional independence. The joint density function is thus
fw˜i,x˜,w˜(wi, x, w) = fw˜i,x˜|w˜(wi, x|w)fw˜(w) = N ′ · exp[−(β′2w2 + β′1(x)w + β′0(x,wi))],
where x ≥ w,wi ≥ w,w ∈ R, N ′ ≡ λ2piσsσw , and β′2 ≡ 12
(
λ2
σ2s
+ 1σ2w
)
, β′1 ≡ −λ
(
1 + λσ2s
x
)
, β′0 ≡
λ2
2σ2s
x2 + λwi. The probability distribution of w˜ conditional on wi and x is
Fw˜|w˜i,x˜(w|wi, x) =
∫ w
−∞ fw˜,w˜i,x˜(w
′, wi, x)dw′∫ x
−∞ fw˜,w˜i,x˜(w
′, wi, x)dw′
=
Φ
(
w−µ′(x)
σ′
)
Φ
(
wi−µ′(x)
σ′
) ,
where σ′ ≡
(
λ2
σ2s
+ 1σ2w
)− 12
and µ′ ≡
(
λ2
σ2s
x+ λ
)
σ′2. If agents make inference only through
observing private signal and x, and if Pf = h(w) = e
w, the equilibrium housing price can
be obtained as
P ′ = Q+ V ′ = Q+
∫ x
−∞
ew
′ · fw˜|w˜i,x˜(w′|x, x)dw′ = ey + exp
(
σ′2
2
+ µ′
)
Φ(κ′ − σ′)
Φ(κ′)
,
where κ′ ≡ σ′
(
x
σ2w
− λ
)
.
(2) Housing Prices Conditional on x˜ = x:
The joint density of x˜ and w˜ is given by
fx˜,w˜(x,w) = fx˜|w˜(x|w) · fw˜(w) = λ
piσsσw
exp[−(β′2w2 + βˆ′1w + βˆ′0)],
where βˆ′1 = β
′
1 + λ and βˆ
′
0 = β
′
0 − λwi. Similar to the other proofs, I have
Vˇ ≡ E(P˜f |x˜ = x) = exp
(
σ′2
2
+ µ′ − λσ′2
)
Φ(κ′ − σ′ + λσ′)
Φ(κ′ + λσ′)
.
Note that this is also the price in the model where agents don’t learn from endogenous price
signals but only condition on their exogenous private signals.
(3) Understanding the Impacts of Learning: A Made-up Example
Assume x˜ = w˜ − s˜λ , y˜ = a˜ − s˜, where w˜, a˜, s˜ are independently normally distributed with
zeros means and variances σ2w, σ
2
a, σ
2
s respectively. Since x˜ and y˜ are linear combinations of
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normal random variables, they are jointly normally distributed with w˜wx
y
 ∼ N

00
0
 ,
σ
2
w σ12 0
σ12 σ
2
x σ23
0 σ23 σ
2
y

 ,
with σ2x = σ
2
w +
σ2s
λ2 , σ
2
y = σ
2
a + σ
2
s , σ12 = σ
2
w, σ23 =
σ2s
λ . Denote the expectation and variance
of w˜ conditional on x˜ = x by µ′ and Σ′ respectively, and the expectation and variance of
w˜ conditional on x˜ = x, y˜ = y by µ and Σ respectively. It follows that µ′ ≡ E(w˜|x˜ =
x) = W ′xx, µ ≡ E(w˜|x˜ = x, y˜ = y) = Wxx + Wyy, and Σ′ ≡ V ar(w˜|x˜ = x) =
(
σ2s
λ2
)
W ′x,
Σ ≡ V ar(w˜|x˜ = x, y˜ = y) =
(
−σ2aλ
)
Wy, where
W ′x ≡
1
σ2s
1
σ2s
+ 1λ2σ2w
,Wx ≡
1
σ2a
+ 1σ2s
1
σ2a
+ 1σ2s
+ 1λ2σ2w
,Wy ≡
− 1λσ2a
1
σ2a
+ 1σ2s
+ 1λ2σ2w
.
It is easy to show that W ′x < Wx and Wy < 0. When σ
2
a → ∞ or λ → ∞, then Wy → 0
and both Wx,W
′
x converge to some constant smaller or equal to one, and the two cases are
converging. Similarly, when λ→ 0, then Wx → 0, W ′x → 0, and Wy → 0, and both converge
to no information case. (i) When σ2a → 0, then Wy → − 1λ , Wx → 1, and W ′x is a constant
smaller than one. Thus, the smaller the λ (but not too small), the larger negative effect from
y but also the larger the difference Wx −W ′x, and the overall effect is ambiguous. However,
because Wx and W
′
x are confined by 1 while Wy could be much larger than 1, the negative
effect tends to dominate; (ii) When σ2s → ∞, then Wy →
− 1
λσ2a
1
σ2a
+ 1
λ2σ2w
, Wx →
1
σ2a
1
σ2a
+ 1
λ2σ2w
, and
W ′x → 0. Thus, the smaller the λ (but not too small), the larger negative effect from y
but also the larger the difference Wx −W ′x, and the overall effect is ambiguous. However,
because Wx and W
′
x are confined by 1 while Wy could be much larger than 1, the negative
effect tends to dominate; (iii) When σ2s → 0, then Wy → 0, Wx → 1, and W ′x → 1.
The conditional expectations of ew are given by Λ′ ≡ E(ew˜|x˜ = x) = exp
(
µ′ + Σ
′
2
)
and
Λ ≡ E(ew˜|x˜ = x, y˜ = y) = exp (µ+ Σ2 ). The law of total variance implies that E(Λ) = E(Λ′).
A.3 Numerical Computations
The mean of housing price is
E(P˜ ) = E(Q˜) + E(V˜ ).
The (additional) effect of rental price on housing price volatility
φ′ =
V ar(Q˜) + V ar(V˜ ) + 2Cov(Q˜, V˜ )
V ar(Q˜) + V ar(V˜ ′) + 2Cov(Q˜, V˜ ′)
.
The excess volatility is
φ∗ =
V ar(Q˜) + V ar(V˜ ) + 2Cov(Q˜, V˜ )
V ar(Q˜) + V ar(P˜f )
.
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(1) Densities
fx˜(x) =
√
2
pi√
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
exp
− x2
2
(
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
)
Φ
 σsλσw x√
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
 ,
fy˜(y) =
√
2
pi√
σ2a + σ
2
s
exp
[
− y
2
2(σ2a + σ
2
s)
]
Φ
(
σs
σa
y√
σ2a + σ
2
s
)
,
fx˜,y˜(x, y) = Nˆ
√
pi
β2
exp
(
βˆ21
4β2
− βˆ0
)
Φ
(√
2β2x+
βˆ1√
2β2
)
.
(2) Mean and Variance of P˜f
E(P˜f ) = exp
(
σ2w
2
)
,
V ar(P˜f ) =
[
exp(σ2w)− 1
]
exp(σ2w).
(3) Mean and Variance of Q˜
E(Q˜) =
∫ ∞
−∞
eyfy˜(y)dy
=
√
2
pi√
σ2a + σ
2
s
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
y − y
2
2(σ2a + σ
2
s)
]
Φ
(
σs
σa
y√
σ2a + σ
2
s
)
dy,
V ar(Q˜) =
∫ ∞
−∞
e2yfy˜(y)dy − [E(Q˜)]2
=
√
2
pi√
σ2a + σ
2
s
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
2y − y
2
2(σ2a + σ
2
s)
]
Φ
(
σs
σa
y√
σ2a + σ
2
s
)
dy − [E(Q˜)]2.
(4) Mean and Variance of V˜
E(V˜ ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
v(x, y) · fx˜,y˜(x, y)dxdy
= Nˆ
√
pi
β2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
σ2
2
+ µ+
(β1 + λ)
2
4β2
− βˆ0
]
×
[
Φ
(
x−µ
σ − σ
)
Φ
(
x−µ
σ + λσ
)
Φ
(
x−µ
σ
) ] dxdy,
V ar(V˜ ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
v2 · fx˜,y˜(x, y)dxdy − [E(V˜ )]2
= Nˆ
√
pi
β2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
σ2 + 2µ+
(β1 + λ)
2
4β2
− βˆ0
]
×
[(
Φ
(
x−µ
σ − σ
))2
Φ
(
x−µ
σ + λσ
)(
Φ
(
x−µ
σ
))2
]
dxdy − (E[V˜ ])2.
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(5) Mean and Variance of V ′
E(V˜ ′) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
v′(x) · fx˜(x)dx
=
√
2
pi√
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
σ′2
2
+ µ′ − x
2
2
(
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
)

×Φ
 σsλσw x√
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
 Φ(κ′ − σ′)
Φ(κ′)
dx,
V ar(V˜ ′) =
∫ ∞
−∞
v′2 · fx˜(x)dx− [E(V˜ ′)]2
=
√
2
pi√
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
σ′2 + 2µ′ − x2
2
(
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
)

×Φ
 σsλσw x√
σ2w +
σ2s
λ2
(Φ(κ′ − σ′)
Φ(κ′)
)2
dx− (E[V˜ ′])2.
(6) Covariances
Cov(Q˜, V˜ ) = E(Q˜V˜ )− E(Q˜)E(V˜ ),
Cov(Q˜, V˜ ′) = E(Q˜V˜ ′)− E(Q˜)E(V˜ ′),
where
E(Q˜V˜ ) = Nˆ
√
pi
β2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
σ2
2
+ µ+ y +
(β1 + λ)
2
4β2
− βˆ0
]
×
[
Φ(κ− σ)Φ(κ+ λσ)
Φ(κ)
]
dxdy,
E(Q˜V˜ ′) = Nˆ
√
pi
β2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
σ′2
2
+ µ′ + y +
(β1 + λ)
2
4β2
− βˆ0
]
×
[
Φ(κ′ − σ′)Φ(κ+ λσ)
Φ(κ′)
]
dxdy.
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Appendix B
To save notation, I omit the superscript i in the following derivations when it is not necessary.
B.1 First-Order Conditions
For each island i, the first-order conditions to the household’s problem and entrepreneur’s
problem are obtained as
C˜t : 1 = Λ˜t,
L˜t+1 : Λ˜tQt = bL˜
−1
t+1 + β˜E˜tΛ˜t+1Qt+1,
B˜t+1 : Λ˜t = β˜(1 +Rt+1)E˜tΛ˜t+1,
Ct : C
−σ
t = Λt,
Kt+1 : Λt = βEtΛt+1
(
α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1− δ
)
,
Lt+1 : ΛtQt = ΦtEtQt+1 + βEtΛt+1
(
γ
Yt+1
Lt+1
+Qt+1
)
,
Bt+1 : Λt = β(1 +Rt+1)EtΛt+1 + Φt(1 +Rt+1),
where Λ˜t is the Lagrangian multiplier of household’s budget constraint, Λt is the Lagrangian
multiplier of entrepreneur’s budget constraint, and Φt is the Lagrangian multiplier of en-
trepreneur’s borrowing constraint. The above first-order conditions, together with the bud-
get constraints for households and entrepreneurs, and the market clearing conditions5 for
each island characterise the competitive equilibrium of the economy of island.
C˜t +Qt(L˜t+1 − L˜t) + B˜t+1 = (1 +Rt)B˜t,
Yt = AtK
α
t L
γ
t ,
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +Qt(Lt+1 − Lt) + (1 +Rt)Bt = Bt+1 + Yt,
(1 +Rt+1)Bt+1 ≤ EtQt+1Lt+1,
L¯ = L˜t + Lt,
B˜t = Bt.
5The good market clearing condition has been omitted because of the Walras’ law.
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B.2 Steady State
Denote the variables in the steady state by the corresponding letters without time subscript.
The steady state of the equilibrium can be characterised by the following equations
1 +R = β˜−1,
Q = bL˜−1 + β˜Q,
C˜ = RB˜;
C−σ = Λ,
1 = β
(
α
Y
K
+ 1− δ
)
,
ΛQ = ΦQ+ βΛ
(
γ
Y
L
+Q
)
,
Λ = β(1 +R)Λ + Φ(1 +R),
Y = AKαLγ ,
C + δK +RB = Y
(1 +R)B = QL;
L˜+ L = 1,
B = B˜.
From Λ = β(1 +R)Λ + Φ(1 +R) and 1 +R = β˜−1, it follows immediately that
Φ = (β˜ − β)Λ,
which is positive because Λ = C−σ > 0 and β˜ − β > 0. From the above equations, we can
also see that the capital-to-output ratio, which determines the return from capital in the
steady state, is given by
K
Y
=
αβ
1− β(1− δ) .
and the price of land in the steady state
Q = (1− β˜)−1βγ Y
L
=
∞∑
j=0
β˜jβγ
Y
L
.
B.3 Log-linearisation
Define
xt ≡ lnXt − lnX.
I log-linearise the model equilibrium around the steady state as below
Λ˜Qqt = −bL˜−1 l˜t+1 + β˜Λ˜QE˜tqt+1,
−σC−σct = Λλt,
λt = β
(
α
Y
K
+ 1− δ
)
Etλt+1 + βα
Y
K
Et(yt+1 − kt+1),
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ΛQ(λt + qt) = ΦQ(φt + Etqt+1) + βΛ
γY
L
Et(λt+1 + yt+1 − lt+1) + βΛQEt(λt+1 + qt+1),
Λλt = βΛEt[(1 +R)λt+1] + (1 +R)Φφt,
C˜
B
c˜t +
QL˜
B
(l˜t+1 − l˜t) + b˜t+1 = (1 +R)b˜t,
yt = at + αkt + γlt,
C
Y
ct +
K
Y
kt+1 − (1− δ)K
Y
kt +
QL
Y
(lt+1 − lt) + (1 +R)B
Y
bt =
B
Y
bt+1 + yt,
(1 +R)bt+1 =
QL
B
(Etqt+1 + lt+1),
L˜l˜t + Llt = 0,
b˜t = bt,
at = θt + t.
where I have used the fact that rt+1 = 0,∀t.
B.4 Rational Expectations Equilibrium: A General Solution
If agents have complete information, in the sense that in each period agents on each is-
land observe both the persistent common shock and the temporary idiosyncratic shock, the
model may be solved by some standard package such as Dynare. If agents have incomplete
information, however, the solution to the model is not readily available using the standard
tool. The strategy I take in this paper is that, I first solve for the rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) under a general information structure. Given the general solution, I
then solve for REE solutions under different information structures in the next subsection.
To obtain a general solution, I rearranged the system in B.3 into three parts:
(i) a high-order stochastic difference equation for qi:
δ1q
i
t−1 + δ2q
i
t + δ3Eit−1qit + (δ4− δ5)Eitqit+1 = δ6Eit−1ait+ δ7ait+ δ8Eitait+1 + δ9
∞∑
j=0
β˜jEitait+2+j ,
(B1)
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(ii) the productivity process ait = θt + 
i
t, and
(iii) other companion equations characterizing the dynamics of each variable as below:
household’s land holding : l˜it+1 =
β˜E˜itqit+1 − qit
1− β˜ ,
entrepreneur’s land holding : lit = −l˜it,
entrepreneur’s debt : bit+1 = Eitqit+1 + lit+1,
household’s lending : b˜it = b
i
t,
entrepreneur’s capital stock : kit+1 = δ10(q
i
t − β˜Eitqit+1)− δ11Eitait+1 − δ12lit+1,
entrepreneur’s good production : yit = a
i
t + αk
i
t + γl
i
t,
household’s consumption : c˜it =
lt+1 − lit − β˜bit+1 + bit
1− β˜ ,
entrepreneur’s consumption : cit =
yit − βγc˜it − δ13[kit+1 − (1− δ)kit]
δ14
,
where {δj}14j=1 are functions of the model parameters: β˜, α, γ, σ, β, δ. The solution to (B1)
is the key to solving for the whole system, because once it is obtained the dynamics of other
variables follow recursively from (iii).
For each island i, denote the agents’ expectations about the persistent shock by
Θit ≡ Eitθt. Then, equation (B1) can be rewritten as
δ1q
i
t−1 + δ2q
i
t + δ3Eit−1qit + (δ4 − δ5)Eitqit+1 = δ6ρΘit−1 +
(
δ8ρ+
δ9ρ
2
1− ρβ˜
)
Θit + δ7a
i
t. (B2)
A general rational expectations equilibrium (REE) solution can be obtained as follows: first
guess a solution for qit
qit = pi1q
i
t−1 + pi2Θ
i
t + pi3Θ
i
t−1 + pi4a
i
t, (B3)
then, substitute the conjecture (B3) into equation (B2), and, finally, impose the rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) restriction to solve for pi’s as a fixed point problem. More
specifically, the substitution yields
δ1q
i
t−1+δ2q
i
t+δ3(pi1q
i
t−1+pi2ρΘ
i
t−1+pi3Θ
i
t−1+pi4ρΘ
i
t−1)+(δ4−δ5)(pi1qit+pi2ρΘit+pi3Θit+pi4ρΘit)
= δ6ρΘ
i
t−1 +
(
δ8ρ+
δ9ρ
2
1− ρβ˜
)
Θit + δ7a
i
t.
Rearranging it, I have
[δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
α1
qit = −(δ1 + δ3pi1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
α2
qit−1+
[(
δ8ρ+
δ9ρ
2
1− ρβ˜
)
− (δ4 − δ5)(pi2ρ+ pi3 + pi4ρ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
α3
Θit
+ [δ6ρ− δ3(pi2ρ+ pi3 + pi4ρ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
α4
Θit−1 + δ7a
i
t.
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Matching the coefficients, I have
pi1 =
α2
α1
=
−(δ1 + δ3pi1)
δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi1 ,
pi4 =
δ7
α1
=
δ7
δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi1 ,
pi2 =
α3
α1
=
δ8ρ+
δ9ρ
2
1−ρβ˜ − (δ4 − δ5)(pi2ρ+ pi3 + pi4ρ)
δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi1 ,
pi3 =
α4
α1
=
δ6ρ− δ3(pi2ρ+ pi3 + pi4ρ)
δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi1 .
Then, pi1 and pi4 can be obtained from the first two equations, and pi2 and pi3 can be obtained
from solving the following two equations
[δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)(pi1 + ρ)]pi2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi3 = δ8ρ+ δ9ρ
2
1− ρβ˜ − (δ4 − δ5)pi4ρ,
δ3ρpi2 + (δ2 + (δ4 − δ5)pi1 + δ3)pi3 = δ6ρ− δ3pi4ρ.
B.5 Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Incomplete Information
I. No Public Signals
The state space is given by
θt = ρθt−1 + vt,
ait = θt + 
i
t.
Using Kalman filter formula, I have
Θit = (1− κ)ρΘit−1 + κait, (B4)
where κ is the stationary Kalman gain
κ ≡
1
σ2
1
σ2r
+ 1σ2
,
in which σ2r can be derived from the stationary Riccati equation
σ2r =
ρ2
1
σ2r
+ 1σ2
+ σ2v .
Substituting (B4) into (B3), land price is obtained as
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)(1− (1− κ)ρL)qit
= [pi4 + pi2κ+ (pi3κ− pi4(1− κ)ρ)L]vt + [pi4 + pi2κ+ (pi3κ− pi4(1− κ)ρ)L](1− ρL)it. (B5)
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II. Exogenous Public Signals
The state space is given by
θt = ρθt−1 + vt,(
ait
s∗t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yt
=
(
1
1
)
︸︷︷ ︸
B
θt +
(
it
η∗t
)
.
Using Kalman filter formula, I have
Θit = (1−KB)ρΘit−1 + KYt, (B6)
where K is the stationary Kalman gain vector
K = σ2r∗
(
1 1
)(σ2r∗ + σ2 σ2r∗ ,
σ2r∗ σ
2
r∗ + σ
2
η∗
)−1
=
(
1
σ2
1
σ2
r∗
+ 1
σ2
η∗
+ 1
σ2
1
σ2
η∗
1
σ2
r∗
+ 1
σ2
η∗
+ 1
σ2
)
≡
(
K1 K2
)
,
where σ2r∗ can be derived from the stationary Riccati equation
σ2r∗ =
ρ2
1
σ2
r∗
+ 1
σ2
η∗
+ 1σ2
+ σ2v .
Substituting (B6) into (B3), land price land price is obtained as
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)(1− (1−KB)ρL)qit = {pi4 + pi2KB + [pi3KB− pi4(1−KB)ρ]L}vt
+{pi4 + pi2K1 + [pi3K1 − pi4(1−KB)ρ]L}(1− ρL)it + (pi2 + pi3L)K2(1− ρL)η∗t . (B7)
If information is revealed with one period lag, I can now define two new observable variables
aˆit and sˆ
∗
t , corresponding to the signals a
i
t and s
∗
t respectively.
aˆit ≡ vt + it,
sˆ∗t ≡ vt + η∗t .
Note that the joint distribution of aˆit, sˆ
∗
t and vt is multi-normal. More specifically,vtaˆit
sˆ∗t
 ∼ N

00
0
 ,
σ
2
v σ
2
v σ
2
v
σ2v σ
2
v + σ
2
 σ
2
v
σ2v σ
2
v σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗

 ,
from which I may compute the expectation of the unobservable shock vt conditional on the
observables {aˆit, sˆ∗t } as
E(vt|aˆit, sˆ∗t ) = W ∗1 (vt + it) +W ∗2 (vt + η∗t ),
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where
W ∗1 ≡
σ2v(σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗)− σ4v
(σ2v + σ
2
 )(σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗)− σ4v
,
W ∗2 ≡
σ2v(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )− σ4v
(σ2v + σ
2
 )(σ
2
v + σ
2
η∗)− σ4v
.
Since Θit = Eit(vt) +
∑∞
j=1 ρ
jvt−j , I have
Θit = Eit(vt) +
∞∑
j=1
ρjvt−j =
(W ∗1 +W ∗2 )vt + ∞∑
j=1
ρjvt−j
+W ∗1 it +W ∗2 η∗t .
Substituting it into (B3), land price is obtained as
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)qit = {(pi2 + pi3L)[ρL+ (1− ρL)(W ∗1 +W ∗2 )] + pi4}vt
+[(pi2 + pi3L)W ∗1 + pi4](1− ρL)it + [(pi2 + pi3L)W ∗2 (1− ρL)]η∗t . (B7′)
III. Endogenous Public Signals
The REE equilibrium land price (B3) can be written as
qit =
[
pi2 + pi3L
1− pi1L
]
Θit +
pi4a
i
t
1− pi1L ≡ B(L)C(L)Θ
i
t + pi4B(L)[A(L)vt + it],
where B(L) ≡ 11−pi1L and C(L) ≡ pi2+pi3L. Note that qt should be a time-invariant function
of exogenous stochastic processes. Hence, I guess
Θit = Pv(L)vt + P(L)it + Pη(L)ηt,
where ηt is the noise shock. Then, the land price function (B3) can be further expressed as
qit = B(L)C(L)[Pv(L)vt + P(L)it + Pη(L)ηt] + pi4B(L)[A(L)vt + it]
= [B(L)C(L)Pv(L) + pi4B(L)A(L)]vt + [B(L)C(L)P(L) + pi4B(L)]it
+B(L)C(L)Pη(L)ηt.
Since information is fully revealed with one period lag, I can now define two new observable
variables aˆit and sˆt, corresponding to the signals a
i
t and st respectively.
aˆit ≡ vt + it,
sˆt ≡ (pi2Pv(0) + pi4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
s1
vt + (1 + pi2Pη(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
s2
ηt.
89
Note that the joint distribution of aˆit, sˆt and vt is multi-normal. More specifically,vtaˆit
sˆt
 ∼ N

00
0
 ,
 σ
2
v σ
2
v s1σ
2
v
σ2v σ
2
v + σ
2
 s1σ
2
v
s1σ
2
v s1σ
2
v s
2
1σ
2
v + s
2
2σ
2
η

 ,
from which I may compute the expectation of the unobservable shock vt conditional on the
observables {aˆit, sˆt} as
E(vt|aˆit, sˆt) = W1(vt + it) +W2(s1vt + s2ηt), (B8)
where
W1 ≡
σ2v(s
2
1σ
2
v + s
2
2σ
2
η)− s21σ4v
(σ2v + σ
2
 )(s
2
1σ
2
v + s
2
2σ
2
η)− s21σ4v
,
W2 ≡ s1σ
2
v(σ
2
v + σ
2
 )− s1σ4v
(σ2v + σ
2
 )(s
2
1σ
2
v + s
2
2σ
2
η)− s21σ4v
.
Given that information is fully revealed one period later, and that θt = ρθt−1 + vt, the
conditional expectation Θit ≡ Eit(θt) can be written as
Θit = Eit(vt) +
∞∑
j=1
ρjvt−j . (B9)
Note that agents’s confusion about θt will only be from current idiosyncratic productivity
shock and noise shock, not those from previous periods. Hence, the conjecture about Θit
can be rewritten as
Θit = Pv(0)vt +
∞∑
j=1
ρjvt−j + P(0)it + Pη(0)ηt. (B10)
Substituting (B8) into (B9) and matching the coefficients with those in the conjecture, I
have
Pv(0) = W1 +W2s1,
P(0) = W1,
Pη(0) = W2s2.
Note that W1 and W2 contain Pv(0) and Pη(0). Solving the nonlinear equations above yields
Pv(0), P(0), and Pη(0). Substituting them back into (B10), I obtain an explicit expression
for Θit, which is then substituted into the general solution (B3) to get the land price function
(1− pi1L)(1− ρL)qit = {(pi2 + pi3L)[ρL+ (1− ρL)Pv(0)] + pi4}vt
+[(pi2 + pi3L)P(0) + pi4](1− ρL)it + [(pi2 + pi3L)Pη(0)(1− ρL)]ηt. (B11)
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B.6 Forecast Errors
Note that E¯t−1θt = ρ
∫
Θit−1di.
(i) For the full information model, the forecast error is given by
ξt = θt − E¯t−1θt = θt − ρθt−1 = vt.
(ii) For the incomplete information model without public signal, the forecast error is given
by
ξt =
[
(1− ρκ− (1− κ)ρL)
(1− (1− κ)ρL)(1− ρL)
]
vt.
(iii) For the incomplete information model with exogenous public signal, the forecast error
is given by
ξt =
[
(1− ρKB− (1−KB)ρL)
(1− (1−KB)ρL)(1− ρL)
]
vt +
[
ρK2L
1− (1−KB)ρL
]
η∗t .
When information is fully revealed one period later, the forecasting error is given by
ξt = vt + ρ(1−W ∗1 −W ∗2 )vt−1 − ρW ∗2 η∗t−1.
(iv) For the incomplete information model with endogenous public signal and information
fully revealed one period later, the forecast error is given by
ξt = θt − E¯t−1θt =
∞∑
j=0
ρjvt−j − ρ
Pv(0)vt−1 + ∞∑
j=1
ρjvt−1−j + Pη(0)ηt−1

= vt + ρ(1− Pv(0))vt−1 − ρPη(0)ηt−1.
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Appendix C
C.1 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The error of the optimal h-step forecast is
Yt+h − Yˆt+h =
h−1∑
s=0
θsut+h−s.
The contribution of forecast error variance of variable i attributable to structural shock j
at horizon h is
h−1∑
s=0
(e′iθsej)
2 =
h−1∑
s=0
(θ(i,j)s )
2,
where ei is i
th column of Ik and θ
(i,j)
s is the ijth element in θs. The share of forecast error
variance of variable i attributable to structural shock j (of k) at horizon h is
Ω
(i,j)
h =
∑h−1
s=0 (e
′
iθsej)
2∑k
j=1
∑h−1
s=0 (e
′
iθsej)
2
=
∑h−1
s=0 (θ
(i,j)
s )2∑k
j=1
∑h−1
s=0 (θ
(i,j)
s )2
.
Because Yt =
∑∞
s=0 θsut−s =
∑∞
s=0 φst−s, and t ≡ B−10 ut, θs ≡ φsB−10 by definition.
Ω
(i,j)
h =
∑h−1
s=0 [(φsB
−1
0 )
(i,j)]2∑k
j=1
∑h−1
s=0 [(φsB
−1
0 )
(i,j)]2
.
C.2 Historical Decomposition
Consider reorganisation of the vector moving average (VMA) representation of Yt+h
Yt+h =
∞∑
s=0
φst+h−s ≡
h−1∑
s=0
φst+h−s +
∞∑
s=h
φst+h−s. (C1)
The first sum represents that part of Yt+h due to innovations in periods t+ 1 to t+h, while
the second sum is the forecast given data through t (because E(ut) = 0 for ut+1, ..., ut+h).
If  = Fu for any full rank (factor) matrix F , the forecast error can be rewritten as
h−1∑
s=0
φst+h−s =
h−1∑
s=0
(φsF )(F
−1t+h−s) =
h−1∑
s=0
(φsF )ut+h−s =
k∑
i=1
h−1∑
s=0
[(φsF )ei](e
′
iut+h−s),
where ei is the i
th column of Ik
6, the first summation regards to k factored shocks, and
the second summation regards to the accumulated horizon. The analysis above implies that
we can decompose the forecast error with some factor matrix F and see how each factored
shock would have affected the historical forecast error. If we want to check the structural
shocks’ effect, then set F = B−10 , and φsF = φsB
−1
0 ≡ θs.
6In the first parentheses ei is used to pick up the i
th column of φsF and in the second parentheses
to pick up the ith factored (or structural) shock. So the vector of forecast error for each variable is
comprised of a vector of sum over all of the structural shocks’ contributions and over horizon h.
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In practice, I do historical decomposition following steps as below7:
(Step 1) Set in (C1) t = p, h ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − p}, and therefore the forecast with shocks is
from p+ 1 to T , where k is the dimension of VAR, p is the maximum lag in VAR, and T is
sample size. Transform the k × (T − p) reduced shocks  into structural shocks u by using
u = B0.
(Step 2) For each i, left multiply column i in B−10 by row i in u to get k stacks of k× (T −p)
matrices. The ith stack matrix represents ith structural shock to all k variables during time
period p+ 1 to T . Denote ith stack matrix as i, which is interpreted as the contribution of
ith structural shock to reduced shock u and
∑k
i=1 u
i = u.
(Step 3) Given initial values Y1, ..., Yp, forecast Yt+h (i.e. from p+ 1 to T ) by adding shocks
uij in each period, where j ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − p}.8
(Step 4) Subtract the base forecast (i.e. forecast without shocks in each period) from the
forecast in step 3 to get the cumulative contributions of each structural shock.
For periods close to the (forecast) starting point (p + 1), the initial values have
substantial impact even in stationary process, so one may want to consider the decomposition
for periods some distance away from the starting point.
C.3 Conditional Correlation
From Yt =
∑∞
s=0 θsut−s, the covariance between variable i and j is
Cov(Yi, Yj) =
∞∑
s=0
θ(i,1)s θ
(j,1)
s +
∞∑
s=0
θ(i,2)s θ
(j,2)
s + ...+
∞∑
s=0
θ(i,k)s θ
(j,k)
s
=
k∑
κ=1
∞∑
s=0
θ(i,κ)s θ
(j,κ)
s ≡
k∑
κ=1
Cov(Yi, Yj |uκ),
and the correlation of variable i and j in Y conditional on the κth structural shock can be
obtained using the following formula
ρ(Yi, Yj |κ) =
∑∞
s=0 θ
(i,κ)
s θ
(j,κ)
s√
[
∑∞
s=0(θ
(i,κ)
s )2][
∑∞
s=0(θ
(j,κ)
s )2]
,
where θ
(i,κ)
s is the (i, κ)th element in θs. In practice, the infinite sums are truncated at some
large but finite lag. Similar to historical decomposition, we can also compute historical
conditional correlation coefficient of Yi and Yj by using the simulated series of Yi and Yj
conditional structural shock κ.9
7Another simple way (easier to understand) to do the historical decomposition: (I) Transform
reduced shocks into structural shocks using B0; (II) Zero out irrelevant structural shocks for each
structural shock, respectively; (III) Transform the k new structural shock (matrices) into new
reduced shocks; (IV) Simulating as if there was only one structural shock in history.
8In this step, I forecast Y recursively. For example, I use updated Yp+1, ..., Yp+p in calculating
Yp+p+1
9Note the similarity with the relationship between FEVD a historical decomposition.
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